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THE OFFENSE OF DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
STATUTORY AND CASE LAW IN NEW YORK
by Josephine Y. King* and Mark Tipperman**
Introduction
If the sentiment entertained by some leaders of the 1975 New
York legislature prevails, the following study, capped by a short
postscript, might be entitled The Life History of a Misdemeanor.
A bill introduced in the state senate would reclassify the driving
while intoxicated [hereinafter DWI] offense and make a first
offense a traffic infraction instead of a misdemeanor.' Why? Not
because recently increased efforts to reduce alcohol-related accidents have deterred, reformed and rehabilitated the drinking
driver, thereby reducing the severity and the frequency of the
problems he creates. Rather, two developments have converged
to exert pressure for change.
The law, particularly in the past five years, has become more
*Ph.D., Bryn Mawr; J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo; Professor of Law,
Hofstra University. The author gratefully acknowledges assistance from the Council on
Law-Related Studies in funding a study of the offense in Nassau County.
**J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, 1973; member New York bar; attorney,
New York State Department of Law.
1. S.284, 198th N.Y. Leg., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced by Sen. Caemmerer, et al.).
At present, N.Y. VE. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1974) provides a tri-level
approach to alcohol offenses. Subsection 1192(1) makes driving while ability is impaired
[hereinafter referred to as DWAI] a traffic infraction, id. § 155, with penalties of mandatory license suspension for sixty days, id. § 510(2)(b)(i), and a fine not to exceed $50.00
and/or a maximum imprisonment of fifteen days, id. § 1800(b) (McKinney 1970). Subsection 1192(2) makes operation of a motor vehicle by a person who has .10 of one percent or
more by weight of alcohol in his blood illegal per se. Subsection 1192(3) prohibits operation
of a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. Subsections 1192(2) and (3) are
misdemeanors carrying penalties of mandatory license revocation, id. § 510(2)(a)(iii), and
a maximum imprisonment of one year and/or a maximum fine of $500.00, id. § 1192(5).
By contrast, Senator Caemmerer's bill would make a first violation of subsections
1192(2), (3), or (4) (drug impairment) a traffic infraction punishable by a maximum jail
sentence of sixty days and/or by a fine of $100-$500. A second conviction within three
years becomes a misdemeanor with increased penalties, and a third such conviction constitutes a felony.
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strict, decreasing the threshold blood alcohol content standard
from .15 to .10 of one percent. Second, enforcement has intensified; the police make more arrests, and more prosecutions are
instituted. Consequently, the criminal courts have experienced a
substantial increase in DWI cases which, as an addition to the
overloaded criminal calendars, becomes an unwelcome if not
unmanageable burden. One of the ways in which that burden can
be diminished is to treat DWI as a traffic infraction with the
consequence that defendants lose their right to trial by jury.2
Parenthetically, this raises a basic question: to what extent
should problems in the administration of justice dictate substantive law and substantive rights?
But one cannot predict success for the proposal to divorce the
DWI offense from its present status as a misdemeanor. In the
legislative equation, bills introduced do not necessarily equal
laws enacted. Statistics for New York reveal that in 1973, more
than 322,000 persons were injured and more than 3,000 persons
killed in traffic accidents.' If New York's experience parallels the
national average, fifty percent of fatal crashes involve drivers
with high concentrations of alcohol in the blood stream.4 Public
concern is legitimate. Introducing milder sanctions for a first
DWI offense may encounter objections not only from those who
counsel mandatory jail sentences for intoxicated drivers but also
from those who believe that current penalties are appropriate and
should be maintained.
2. It has been estimated that a contested DWI case tried before a judge in Nassau
County can be completed in three hours, while a jury trial requires two days. In fact, the
large majority of DWI cases in Nassau County are disposed of by plea bargaining. Whereas
in 85 to 90 percent of the cases the charge is for DWI or per se offenses, N.Y. VEH. &TRAP.
LAW § 1192(2)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974), approximately only 10 percent result in conviction for these offenses. R. ULMER & D. PREussER, ANALysis OF JuDiciL DIsPosMoN OF

ALCOHOL RELATED T mAFic
ARRESTS 8 (1973) (Report prepared for U.S. Dep't of Transporta.
tion in conjunction with Nassau County, N.Y. Alcohol Safety Action Program). But see
Hearings on Motor Vehicle Offenses Before N.Y. Legislative Comm. on Transportation,
197th Leg., 37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (wherein Judge Alfred S. Robbins,
Administrative Judge of the District Court of Nassau County, estimated that a non.jury
trial would take between a day and a day and a half).
In 1973 there were 5,335 DWI cases in Nassau County. Justice T. Farley, Administra.
tive Judge, Annual Report on the Courts of Nassau County 34 (1973). It would have been
impossible for the district courts of Nassau County to try all of these DWI cases. See,
Hearings, supra note 2, at 40-41.
3. N.Y.S. DEP'T. OF MOTOR VEHICLZs, AcciDENT FACTS '74, at 6 (1974) (available from
Office of Public Information, N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, Albany, N.Y.).
4. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY
REPORT 14 (Comm. on Public Works, Comm. Print 90-34 (1968)).
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Psychological and emotional factors, however, spell defeat
for any unidirectional approach to this offense. An ambivalence
in attitude (reflected in judges, juries, legislators) is apparent. If
an intoxicated person drives along the road erratically, and other
alert drivers exercise patience and caution, he may not injure
anyone. He may be viewed with sympathy and tolerance. A judge
or jury would hesitate to impose maximum penalties. But if that
same intoxicated driver causes the death of a pedestrian or occupants of his or another vehicle, his act takes on the character of
a serious crime. Both extremes must be dealt with by the law.
There is an inherent contradiction revealed here as elsewhere
in the criminal justice system. Evolution of the DWI statute generally demonstrates an increasing firmness on the part of the
legislature; concurrently, plea bargaining from the misdemeanor
charge to a traffic infraction is rampant and juries seldom convict
for the misdemeanor. 5 The conflict between the law on the books
and the law in practice is one characteristic of the offense. Aware
of this, legislators may prefer to retain the offense as a misdemeanor, to keep the "formal" law tough, realizing that it is tempered by plea bargaining and by sympathetic juries.
For these reasons, an understanding of the past is instructive
for the present and the future. Some of the issues confronting
legislatures and courts have been settled. More continue as open
questions to be considered in each case. Among these are problems of proof. There is no formalized definition, automatically
applicable to all cases of the essential elements of the offense.
Furthermore, prosecutions seldom rely solely on a per se DWI
charge, i.e., that the driver's blood alcohol content [hereinafter
referred to as BAC] tested .10 or more. Observational testimony
is almost invariably introduced. What kind of observational testimony is admissible and persuasive? On the administrative
side-in article 78 proceedings' whereby the driver seeks to have
his license revocation annulled-questions of the validity of the
underlying arrest, the sufficiency of warnings and whether or not
a driver refused a chemical test continue to be actively litigated.
The persistently large volume of these cases attests to the fact
that there is no pat formula of decision which makes precedent
obsolete.
5. Hearings, supranote 2, at 3.
6. N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§ 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1963). For discussion see notes 46, 15358, 300-19 infra and accompanying text.
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A knowledge of the statutory and decisional law can aid the
judge, prosecutor and defense counsel in future cases. But an
examination of the development of New York law yields more
than practical results. It is a framework for current moral and
social questioning of the efficacy of the criminal law. For here we
see a complex and sustained legislative effort to bring a particular
kind of conduct under control; yet there is no dramatic reduction
in the serious consequences of that conduct-death and injury on
the highways. Some reasons for the underachievement of the law
and some observations on alternatives are presented at the conclusion of this study.
I. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
Evolution of the DWI Statute, 1910-1953
The offense of driving while intoxicated made its first appearance in the laws of New York in 1910.1 The statute failed to
define the meaning of "intoxication" or "operation of a motor
vehicle." Its emphasis was upon punishment. A first offense was
a misdemeanor but a second conviction became a felony with a
prison term more severe than later legislation provided.' Suspension and revocation of the driver's license or registration were
placed in the hands of the Secretary of State upon recommendation of the trial court. Reissuance of a license or registration
rested within the discretion of the Secretary of State following a
7. Ch. 374, § 290(3), [1910] Laws of N.Y. 684, amending Highway Law of 1909, ch.
30 [1909] Laws of N.Y. 684-85, stating:
Punishment for operating motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition ...
Whoever operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. .

.

. [Ihf any person be convicted a second time..

.

he shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less
than one year and not more than five years. A conviction of a violation of this
subdivision shall be reported forthwith by the trial court or the clerk thereof to
the secretary of state, who shall upon recommendation of the trial court suspend
the license of the person so convicted or if he be an owner the certificate of
registration of his motor vehicle and, if no appeal therefrom be taken, or if an
appeal duly taken be dismissed, or the judgment affirmed, and upon notice
thereof by said clerk, the secretary of state shall revoke such license or in the
case of an owner the certificate of registration of his motor vehicle, and shall
order the license or certificate of registration delivered to the secretary of state,
and shall not reissue to him said license or certificate of registration unless the
secretary of state in his discretion, after an investigation or upon a hearing,
decides to reissue or issue such license or certificate.
8. The later statute decreased the minimum sentence from the prior one year to sixty
days, and decreased the maximum from the prior five years to two. Ch. 360, § 30, [1924]
Laws of N.Y. 678, amending ch. 374, § 290(3), [1910] Laws of N.Y. 684.
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hearing or investigation.9
Early case law provided at least a partial definition-of intoxication and operation, two essential elements of the offense which
received extensive elaboration in later decisions. The Third Department of the Appellate Division of New York construed the
prohibition against driving while intoxicated to mean "that one
shall not be affected by alcoholic beverage to such an extent as
to impair his judgment or his ability to operate an automobile."' 0
One "is intoxicated when he has imbibed enough liquor to render
him incapable of giving that attention and care to the operation
of his automobile that a man of prudence and reasonable intelligence would give."" Operation was defined to encompass manipulation of the machinery for the purpose of putting the automobile
in motion. 2 Thus the statute could be violated by starting the
motor without moving the car.
A decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department
made it clear that the courts of special sessions had exclusive,
original jurisdiction over the DWI misdemeanor and authority to
impose a maximum sentence of one year imprisonment or a fine
not exceeding $500 or both. 3
Except for the creation in 1926 of a new felony-causing
serious bodily injury to another by driving while intoxicated"4-no
statutory modification of significance occurred until the major
revision of 1929. In that year, the legislature repealed section 290
(3) and enacted section 70 (5) retaining the misdemeanor-felony
distinction between a first and second offense and prescribing the
punishment for the felony. 5 Revocation and suspension provi9. Ch. 374, § 290(3), [1910] Laws of N.Y. 684. The Secretary of State as administra-

tive official responsible for receiving the recommendation of the trial court, was replaced
by the tax commission, ch. 580, § 12 [1921] Laws of N.Y. 1779, and shortly thereafter by
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, ch. 732, § 1, [1926] Laws of N.Y. 1369.
10. People v. Weaver, 188 App. Div. 395, 400, 177 N.Y.S. 71, 74 (3d Dep't 1919).
11. Id.
12. People v. Domagala, 123 Misc. 757, 206 N.Y.S.288 (Erie County Ct. 1924).
13. People ex rel. Pierce v. Howe, 218 App. Div. 273, 218 N.Y.S. 361 (2d Dep't 1926).
Such punishment was provided by statute. See ch. 88, [1909] Laws of New York 141.
14. Ch. 732, § 1, [1926] Laws of N.Y. 1369.
15. Ch. 54, § 70(5), [1929] Laws of N.Y. 91 stating:

Punishment for operating motor vehicle or motor cycle while in an intoxicated
condition. Whoever operates a motor vehicle or motor cycle while in an intoxicated condition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Whoever operates a motor
vehicle or motor cycle while in an intoxicated condition after having been convicted of operating a motor vehicle or motor cycle while in an intoxicated condition shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punishable by imprisonment for not
less than sixty days nor more than two years and by a fine of not less than two
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sions were placed in a separate new section, section 71,11 and it is
here that a substantial change of emphasis becomes apparent.
Whereas the former law treated suspension and revocation as
discretionary, section 71 stated that a license must be revoked if
the holder is convicted of driving while intoxicated. At this point,
therefore, mandatory revocation of the operator's license became
established as a consequence of conviction.
Only one other of the amendments in the early statutory
development of the law17 is of singular importance. In 1941, the
legislature amended section 70 (5) to permit the admissibility at
trial of results of tests for BAC.'5 A finding that the vehicle operahundred dollars nor more than two thousand dollars.
16. Ch. 54, § 71, [1929] Laws of N.Y. 94:
Suspension, revocation and reissuance of licenses and certificates of registration.
Any city magistrate, any city judge, any judge of a court of special sessions in a
city, any supreme court justice, any county judge, any judge of a court of general
sessions, the superintendent of state police and the commissioner of motor vehicles or any person deputized by him, shall have power to revoke or suspend the
license to drive a motor vehicle or motor cycle of any person, or in the case of
an owner, the certificate of registration, as follows:
Such licenses must be revoked and such certificates of registration may also
be revoked where the holder is convicted (a) of homicide or assault arising out
of the operation of a motor vehicle or motor cycle, whether the conviction was
had in this state or elsewhere; (b) of any violation of subdivisions five or eight
of section seventy or of driving a motor vehicle or motor cycle while intoxicated
although the conviction was had outside this state ...
17. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that in 1934, the legislature
enacted ch. 439, § 1, [1934] Laws of N.Y. 1021, the predecessor to the arrest provisions
now found in N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193 (McKinney 1970). For discussion, see notes
104, 303-08 infra and accompanying text. And in 1941, the legislature revised the penalty
for a second DWI conviction from fine and jail to fine and/or jail. Ch. 726, § 1, [1941]
Laws of N.Y. 1623, amending ch. 54, § 70(5), [1929] Laws of N.Y. 91.
18. Ch. 726, § 1, [1941] Laws of N.Y. 1623, amending ch. 54, § 70(5), [1929] Laws
of N.Y. 91:
Upon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been
committed by any person arrested for operating a motor vehicle or motor cycle
while in an intoxicated condition, the court may admit evidence of the amount
of alcohol in the defendant's blood taken within two hours of the time of the
arrest, as shown by a medical or chemical analysis of his breath, blood, urine,
or saliva. For the purposes of this section (a) evidence that there was, at the
time, five-hundredths of one per centum, or less, by weight of alcohol in his
blood, is prima facie evidence that the defendant was not in an intoxicated
condition; (b) evidence that there was, at the time, more than five-hundredths
of one per centum and less than fifteen-hundredths of one per centum by weight
of alcohol in his blood is relevant evidence, but it is not to be given prima facie
effect in indicating whether or not the defendant was in an intoxicated condition; (c) evidence that there was, at the time, fifteen-hundredths of one per
centum, or more, by weight of alcohol in his blood, may be admitted as prima
facie evidence that the defendant was in an intoxicated condition.
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tor had .05 of one percent or less by weight of alcohol in his blood
became prima facie evidence of no intoxication. A test result
showing more than .05 but less than .15 became relevant evidence
of intoxication. A BAC of .15 or more was admissible as prima
facie evidence of intoxication. This legislation in 1941 marks the
beginning of a protracted struggle to define scientifically a standard for intoxication and to provide some objective evidentiary
basis on which to determine guilt or innocence. The rather extraordinary and futile exertions of the legislature in devising complex systems of BAC strata of proof are related in subsequent
portions of this study.
Emerging Issues in D WE Prosecutions
To deduce logical predictions of future central issues in DWI
prosecutions from the scattered and divergent cases of the early
period would be chimerical. But some patterns are faintly discernible.
There is a trace of the constitutional question of selfincrimination framed in the context of the doctor-patient privilege. Was a defendant compelled to be a witness against himself
when a doctor who examined him for purposes of determining
intoxication gave evidence of the results of that examination? In
People v. Dennis,19 the court held that a mere oral and observational (nonphysical) examination was not a violation of defendant's constitutional privilege, despite the absence of counsel.
And evidence of the results of a blood test, based on a sample
withdrawn by a physician who did not analyze the sample and
who was not "treating" the defendant at the time in question, was
not barred by the doctor-patient privilege. °
Understandably, defendants faced with a felony charge for a
second DWI offense were concerned with the question of what was
a prior conviction and how was it established? A prior suspended
sentence was equated to a conviction to permit a felony indictment of a DWI defendant. 2 A prior conviction could be estab19. 132 Misc. 410, 230 N.Y.S. 510 (Cortland County Ct. 1928).
20. People v. Barnes, 197 Misc. 477, 98 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Wayne County Ct. 1950).
21. See People v. Goho, 265 App. Div. 1030, 39 N.Y.S.2d 665 (4th Dep't 1943) (per

curiam) (applying ch. 467, § 1, [1918] Laws of N.Y. 1971).See also People ex rel. Seagrist
v. Mederer, 33 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1942). But an out of state conviction for driving under the influence was not deemed a prior conviction for the purposes of
a DWI felony indictment for driving in an intoxicated condition. People v. Pardee, 202
Misc. 238, 117 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Westchester County Ct. 1952), afl'd mem., 282 App. Div.
735, 122 N.Y.S.2d 902 (2d Dep't), afl'd mem., 306 N.Y. 660, 116 N.E.2d 495 (1953).
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lished by defendant's uncorroborated admission at arraignment
or at trial.2"
It was to no avail for defendant to argue about the site of his
driving, that the statute did not apply to driveways23 and parking
lots.24 The courts decided that the ownership or particular kind
of thoroughfare was not the issue and that the legislature had
This position has
proscribed drunk driving as unlawful conduct.
25
law.
case
later
the
in
maintained
been
Two problems encountered in early prosecutions cast long
shadows into the future. One relates to the narrow issue of warning; the second was and continues to be too diffuse to classify
other than as problems of proving that a driver's conduct violated
the DWI statute.
At this stage, defendants could not contend that prosecutions must be abandoned or convictions reversed because they
received no Miranda28 warnings of the right to remain silent or the
right to counsel. Neither could they invoke the protection of the
implied consent law through its requirement of a clear notification to the DWI suspect that his license would be revoked if he
refused a chemical test. These contexts of warning did not develop until the 1960's. The issue as formulated in the 1930's referred to the requirement contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure.7 Before accepting a plea of guilty or entering a judgment of conviction for violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law,
the judicial officer was required to inform the defendant that in
addition to any criminal sanction, he might suffer the suspension
or revocation of his license. 28 The requirement was not strictly
22. People v. Warner, 152 Misc. 607, 274 N.Y.S. 689 (Chenango County Ct. 1934).
23. People v. Rue, 166 Misc. 845, 2 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Middletown City Ct. 1938).
24. Id. (dicta); People v. Taylor, 202 Misc. 265, 111 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Magis. Ct. of N.Y.
City, Borough of Queens 1952).
25. See note 301 infra.
26. Miranda v- Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27. Ch. 124, § 1, [1937] Laws of N.Y. 180 (codified as N.Y. CODE OF CrM. PRo. §
335-a):

Provisions applicable to pleas of guilty for violations of vehicle and traffic
law. The magistrate, after the arrest of a person charged with a violation of the
vehicle and traffic law, and before accepting a plea of guilty or entering a

judgment of conviction pursuant thereto, must inform the defendant that upon
conviction, not only will he be liable to a penalty, but that, in addition, his
license to drive a motor vehicle or motor cycle, or in the case of an owner, the

certificate of registration of his motor vehicle or motor cycle, may be suspended
or revoked.
28. Harrigan v. Fletcher, 187 Misc. 929, 69 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1946),
aff'd, 271 App. Div.723, 69 N.Y.S.2d 158 (3d Dep't 1947); McCord v. Fletcher, 182 Misc.
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observed."
As to the sufficiency of proof necessary to-convict, the only
conclusion that may be ventured is that some prosecutions proceeded on slim evidence and were reversed. 0 The results of the
drunkometer test were held admissible in 1952.31 But widespread
use of the breathalyzer, judicial notice of the reliability of that
instrument,32 and better defined standards of proof did not
emerge until later decades.
H-. THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW
The license revocation penalty and blood alcohol evidentiary
provisions of the law enacted in 194111 produced no significant
effect upon the consequences of driving while intoxicated in the
post-war period when the increase in motor vehicle accidents
and fatalities became an object of national concern. The New
York State Joint Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicle Problems in its report issued in 195311 concluded that the intoxicated
driver constituted the most dangerous menace on the road. It
noted that studies revealed that the drinking driver was involved
in 55 percent of traffic deaths, personal injuries and property
damage accidents, 3 and that the amount of alcohol ingested corresponded to the risk of accidents.36
The Committee recognized that observational testimony
based on traditional "indicia" of intoxication lacked accuracy
and the convincing quality necessary to persuade an often sympathetic jury, particularly when witnesses were not available. To
the Committee, the chemical test of blood alcohol content ap447, 44 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1943).
29. See In re Albroza, 173 Misc. 385, 19 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Suffolk County Ct. 1940) where
the court accepted the affidavit of the justice of the peace corroborated by an affidavit of
the District Attorney to establish compliance although the certificate of conviction disclosed no evidence that defendant was properly warned in accordance with the law.
30. See, e.g., People v. Brewster, 252 App. Div. 877, 300 N.Y.S. 75 (2d Dep't 1937)
(mem.); People v. Fox, 256 App. Div. 578, 10 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1st Dep't 1939); People v.
Strauss, 260 App. Div. 880, 22 N.Y.S.2d 880 (2d Dep't 1940). But see People v. Belcher,
302 N.Y. 529, 99 N.E.2d 874 (1951); People v. O'Neil, 201 Misc. 402, 104 N.Y.S.2d 863
(Schoharie County Ct. 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 747, 103 N.E.2d 538 (1952) (mem.).
31. People v. Spears, 201 Misc. 666, 114 N.Y.S.2d 869 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1952).
32. See notes 269-71 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 16 & 18 supra.
34. NEW YORK STATE JoINr LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON MOTOR VEIUCLE PROBLEMS, CmflcAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION, 3 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 25, 176th N.Y. Leg., 11 (1953).
35. Id., citing Grimm, Drunken Driver, 43 Ohio Op. 60, 61 (1950).
36. Id., citing Holcomb, Alcohol in Relation to Traffic Accidents, 111 J.A.M.A. 1076
(1938).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 1

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 3, 1975]

peared as an answer, not only to convict the drunk driver but also
to vindicate the innocent. It reviewed the use of chemical tests
in other states and noted the impressive rate of conviction.37
In proposing a bill which would by legislative fiat imply a
motorist's consent to chemical tests of BAC, the Committee at
the same time realized that the use of force in administering such
a test was not recommended by the Attorney General of New
York8 and, at least inferentially, by the Supreme Court of the
United States. 9 Accordingly, the motorist's "right" to refuse a
chemical test was incorporated in the Committee's recommended
legislation.
The result was the enactment of section 71-a as a new provision in the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, effective on July
1, 1953. 4o
1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle or motor cycle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine or saliva for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of his blood provided that
such test is administered at the direction of a police officer
having reasonable grounds to suspect such person of driving in
an intoxicated condition. If such person refuses to submit to
such chemical test the test shall not be given but the commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege.
An analysis of section 71-a reveals not only the novel provision of implied consent and the apparently contradictory right of
refusal but also other rights of the suspected driver, the penalty
for refusal and constitutional issues. The statute declares that
any person who operates a motor vehicle in New York has given
an implicit, constructive and presumed assent to a chemical test
to determine BAC. The limiting clause in the first sentence of
subdivision 1 requires that the test be at the direction of a police
officer who has "reasonable grounds to suspect" (not "reasonable
grounds to believe" or "probable cause") the driver is intoxicated. As originally enacted, the statute did not prescribe that a
valid arrest precede the test.
37. Id., citing NATIONAL SArr'

CoUNCIL, REPORT OF THE COMM. FOR TESTS FOR INTOXI-

1951.
38. 1941 N.Y. ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 143.
39. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
40. Ch. 854, § 1, [1953] Laws of N.Y. 1876. For an empirical study of a comparable

CATION, USES OF CHEMIcAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION IN

implied consent law see Hunvald & Zimring, Whatever Happened to Implied Consent? A
Sounding, 33 Mo. L. Ray. 323 (1968).
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The driver who is tested has the right to the results, the right
to have only a licensed physician withdraw a blood sample and
a physician of his choice perform a separate
the right to have
1
4
chemical test.

While the consent to be tested is implicit, the refusal must
be explicit. However, upon refusal, the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles shall revoke the driver's license or permit. There is absolutely nothing contained in this penalty provision which was declaratory of the procedure for revocation and no discretion was
vested in the Commissioner."
The rationale of implied consent appears to rest on a characterization of driving as a "privilege" which may be regulated
through the police power of the state. If the foregoing proposition
is legally valid, why permit the driver to refuse the test to which
he has already "consented"? The obvious explanation is twofold:
the mechanical difficulties of administering a test by physical
compulsion, and the constitutional danger of extracting evidence
by brute physical coercion. In People v. Rochin, the Uaited States
Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the ground that disgorging of evidence by forcible means was "too close to the rack and
the screw," and therefore a violation of due process.43
While avoiding the pitfall of infringing upon due process by
permitting refusal of a chemical test rather than compelling its
forcible administration, the legislature omitted more sophisti41. Ch. 854, § 1, [1953] Laws of N.Y. 1876:
2. Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such a test
shall be made available to him.
3. Only a duly licensed physician acting at the request of a police officer
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein.
This limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine, saliva or breath specimen.
4. The person tested shall be permitted to have a physician of his own
choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the one administered at the
direction of the police officer.
42. For later additions of the hearing and warning requirements see text accompanying note 59 infra. See generally Reeder, Interpretationof Implied Consent Laws by the
Courts, 19 ThRic DIG. & REv. (Mar., May, June, Aug. 1971).
43. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
where the Court sanctioned use of a blood sample taken by a physician in a hospital over
the defendant's objection; Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), where the Court
found no denial of due process in the extraction of a blood specimen from an unconscious
motorist. For a recent application of Schmerber, see People v. John Smith, 172 N.Y.L.J.
115, Dec. 16, 1974, at 19, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974) where the court refused
the request of the District Attorney for an order directing the defendant to submit to a
surgical procedure to remove a bullet from his body. Affidavits submitted by the District
Attorney claimed that the bullet was material to the investigation of a homicide.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 1

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 3, 1975]

cated procedural protections in its flat revocation provision. This
issue was successfully raised in a case arising soon after the enact4
ment of section 71-a. 4
The constitutional safeguards against self-incrimination,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right to counsel
quickly emerged as grounds for challenging the new law. The
reaction of the courts of New York is reflected in several comprehensive cases arising under the 1953 statute.
The definitive case under section 71-a was Schutt v.
MacDuff.l5 The petitioner,'Schutt, brought a proceeding" against
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to annul the revocation of
his driver's license. The license had been revoked for petitioner's
refusal to submit to a blood test. Petitioner had been arrested
without a warrant for operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. He refused the police officer's request to go to a
hospital for a blood test. Petitioner was arraigned, entered a plea
of not guilty and the proceeding was adjourned. Prior to the criminal trial, petitioner's license was revoked for failure to submit to
a chemical test to determine BAC. Subsequently, petitioner was
tried and found not guilty by a jury.
In an article 78 proceeding, petitioner alleged the unconstitutionality of section 71-a on the following grounds: self-incrimination, unreasonable search and seizure, violation of due process
and equal protection.
The court in Schutt announced preliminarily its basic sympathy with the effort of the legislature to "clear the highways
from menace of the intoxicated driver."' 7 It expressed the opinion
that "[t]he failure to convict in a particular case is generally due
to the inability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
driver was intoxicated. Thus any statute tending to assist in marshalling of definite evidence as to the state of intoxication of an
accused is a step in the right direction.' 8 Classifying operation
of a motor vehicle upon the highways of New York as a qualified
44. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. Orange County
1954).
45. Id.

46. Proceedings commenced against the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles under the
New York Civil Practice Act, ch. 526, § 1 [1937] Laws of N.Y. 1186 (codified as
N.Y.C.P.A. § 1283 et seq.), and since 1963 under N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§ 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1963), will hereinafter be referred to as article 78 proceedings.
47. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 46, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 121 (Sup. Ct. Orange
County 1954).

48. Id.
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right subject to reasonable regulation, the court concluded that
section 71-a did not violate the federal or state privilege against
self-incrimination.4 9 One may waive a constitutional privilege.
Furthermore, the introduction in evidence of the results of a
chemical test would not be barred under this same constitutional
privilege because New York case law had limited the protection
to testimonial compulsion-"disclosures by utterance, oral or
written." 0
Rebutting petitioner's contention that section 71-a permitted
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the New York
State Constitution, article I, section 12, the court declared that
since petitioner was lawfully arrested, he could be searched for
evidence of the crime.5 1 The "search" in this particular context,
would mean the chemical test and its results. Since a driver is not
tested unless he consents, the "search" is not unreasonable."
Disposing of the equal protection challenge in a few sentences,5 3 the court turned to due process and here discovered substance in the petitioner's contentions. Viewing the fourteenth
amendment and state guarantees as a "protection against the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government," 54 the court recognized its duty to strike down a statute which permitted administrative decisions without opportunity for a hearing. 5 The focal
point of the due process infirmity of the statute lay in the possibility of arbitrary action by police officers and the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles under section 71-a. First, the statute did not
require a valid arrest as a predicate to the demand that the driver
take a chemical test. Second, a license could be revoked without
a hearing. As to the first objection-no prior, valid arrest-the
officer could demand a test on mere suspicion and the refusal of
the driver could be transmitted to the Commissioner without
even a sworn report by the police officer." Thus the license might
49. As to the fifth amendment of the federal Constitution, the court held that guarantee inapplicable to state proceedings, citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 47-48, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 122 (Sup. Ct. Orange County
1954). Neither did the statute, in the court's view, offend the N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Id.
at 48, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
50. Id. at 48-49, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
51. Id. at 49, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 124. Furthermore, since petitioner refused the test, the
allegedly unconstitutional provision of the statute did not injure him. Id. at 50, 127
N.Y.S.2d at 124.
52. Id. at 50, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
53. Id. at 50-51, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
54. Id. at 51, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 51-52, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
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be revoked upon mere hearsay without the protection of an evidentiary hearing. The court held that section 71-a was defective
on due process grounds in failing to require a lawful arrest
antecedent to a chemical test and in permitting revocation of a
57
driver's license without a hearing.
As a result of Schutt v. MacDuff, the legislature amended
section 71-a(1) as follows:58
1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle or motor cycle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of his blood provided that
such test is administered at the direction of a police officer
having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been
driving in an intoxicated condition and in accordancewith the
rules and regulationsestablished by the police force of which he
is a member. If such person having been placed under arrestand
having thereafter been requested to submit to such chemical
test refuses to submit to such chemical test the test shall not be
given but the commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to
drive and any non-resident operating privilege; provided, however, the commissioner shall grant such person an opportunity
to be heard but a license, permit or non-resident operating
privilege may, upon the basis of a sworn report of the police
officer that he had reasonable grounds to believe such arrested
person to have been driving in an intoxicated condition and that
said person had refused to submit to such test, be temporarily
suspended without notice pending the determinationupon any
such hearing. The provisions of subdivisions five and six of section seventy-one of this law shall be applicable to revocations
under this section.
The significant changes prescribed that the police officer
have reasonable grounds to believe rather than reasonable
grounds to suspect that the driver was intoxicated, that an arrest
precede the request to submit to a chemical test, that a license
or permit may be temporarily suspended based upon a sworn
police report that there was reasonable grounds to believe intoxication and the person refused a test, and that the Commissioner
must grant the accused an opportunity to be heard before revoking a license or permit. 9
57. Id. at 54, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
58. Ch. 320, § 1, [1954] Laws of N.Y. 1009, amending, ch. 854 § 1 [1953] Laws of
N.Y. 1876 (amendments emphasized).
59. The Governor, in support of the 1954 legislation, stated that drinking drivers were
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The new statute was promptly challenged in Anderson v.
MacDuff,66 a case which runs somewhat parallel to Schutt except
that in Anderson, the petitioner was actually acquitted of DWI
before his license was revoked by the Commissioner. Anderson
had refused to submit to a blood test after his arrest. The Commissioner held a hearing at which petitioner testified and was
represented by counsel. Thereafter Anderson's license was revoked on the ground that he refused a blood test. It should be
noted that the due process requirements of the 1954 amendment
(prior arrest and hearing) were followed.
Anderson, however, attacked the constitutionality of the procedure under amended section 71-a for failure of the police officer
to warn specifically that refusal to submit to a test for BAC carried the penalty of license revocation. 1 The statute contained no
direction to warn the arrested motorist."2 The court, reverting to
the language of privilege-that operation of a motor vehicle on
the highways of New York was not a right but a privilege to which
the state could affix conditions-upheld the statute as clear on
its face, not requiring more of the police officer than to request
the motorist to submit to a test. At the same time, the court did
comment that it would be "better practice" for the police to
notify the driver of the consequences of a refusal.63
Where the defendant had agreed to a blood test but then
argued that the results were inadmissible because he had not
been informed of the consequences of refusal, the Court of Appeals held that section 71-a(1) was inapplicable. Whatever due
process requirements were associated with the penalty of revocation in DWI cases had no application to a case where the defendant had voluntarily consented to a test. 4
Another kind of warning, however, was maintained and
involved in one-third of fatal collisions. He noted that this amendment to section 71-a was
designed to cure any constitutional defects of the 1953 statute respecting revocation of
license following refusal to submit to a test. Governor's Message Concerning Chemical
Tests for Intoxicated Drivers, 1954 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 391.
60. 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. Montgomery County 1955).
61. Id. at 273, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 258; accord, People v. Coppock, 206 Misc. 89, 133
N.Y.S.2d 174 (City of N.Y. Ct. of Spec. Sess., N. Y. County 1954).
62. The statute was subsequently amended to include a warning provision. Ch. 85, §
1, [19681 Laws of N.Y. 672, amending ch. 963, § 1, [19661 Laws of N.Y. 3230.
63. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 273, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (Sup. Ct. Montgomery County 1955).
64. People v. Ward, 307 N.Y. 73, 120 N.E.2d 211 (1954).
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strengthened after the enactment of the implied consent law. The
legislature amended the Code of CriminalProcedure,5 substituting the word "instruct" for "inform" in prescribing a court's obligation to appraise the driver of the consequences of a guilty plea.
A revocation was annulled where the court failed to state that
revocation of the defendant's driver's license was mandatory."
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department interpreted the statute to permit a uniform warning; a reading to defendant of section 335-a was deemed adequate compliance."
By the amendments of 195368 and 1954,11 the legislature restricted the required judicial warnings to arraignments within the
state of New York.7" A petitioner could no longer seek annulment
of revocation of his license 7' or of his registration 72 on grounds that

an out of state court failed to comply with section 335-a of the
7 3 For example, an out
New York Code of CriminalProcedure.
of
state conviction was upheld as grounds for mandatory revocation
in a case where defendant was not warned that he would lose his
driving privilege and where he had no access to counsel or the
74
right to have a blood test.

65. Ch. 288, § 1, [1953] Laws of N.Y. 943, amending ch. 418, § 1 [1947] Laws of
N.Y. 937.
66. Application of Conklin, 127 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Chenango County 1954).
67. See Eckerson v. MacDuff, 284 App. Div. 56, 130 N.Y.S.2d 367 (4th Dep't 1954).
68. Ch. 288, § 1, [1953] Laws of N.Y. 943.
69. Ch. 664, § 1, [1954] Laws of N.Y. 1561, amending ch. 288, § 1, [1953] Laws of
N.Y. 943.
70. The intention of the legislature was to modify the holding in Harrigan v. Fletcher,
187 Misc. 929, 69 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1946), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 723,
69 N.Y.S.2d 158 (2d Dep't 1947).
71. N.Y. VEH. & TnR. LAW § 71(2)(b) (McKinney 1952).
72. N.Y. VEH. & TRE. LAw § 94(a) (McKinney 1952).
73. See Knaup v. MacDuff, 206 Misc. 1022, 136 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1954) (out of state convictions could supply the predicate for mandatory revocation under section 71(2)(b) if sufficient documentary evidence substantiated a ground for
conviction specified by that section); Moore v. MacDuff, 283 App. Div. 596, 128 N.Y.S.2d
856 (3d Dep't 1954), appeal dismissed, 308 N.Y. 775, 125 N.E.2d 163, rev'd, 309 N.Y. 35,
127 N.E.2d 741 (1955) (Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division because the
evidence before the hearing officer was unclear as to whether the petitioner in entering a
guilty plea under the CANADIN CarMUAL CODE § 285 (4) (a) (1953) had pleaded guilty to
conduct that would have constituted an offense under the New York statute).
A conviction under a Virginia statute which included intoxication due to narcotics or
other drugs was held to lack the specific reference to an offense under section 71 (2)(b) to
qualify as a basis for revocation. The revocation was annulled in Heidtman v. MacDuff,
132 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1954).
74. Coleman v. Kelly, 12 Misc.2d 116, 175 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County
1957).
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Evidentiary Problems under the Implied Consent Law
One issue which surfaced after the enactment of the implied
consent law was whether or not the driver's refusal to submit to
75
a BAC test was admissible in evidence. In People v. Stratton,
defendant was arrested for causing the death of a person while
defendant was driving in an intoxicated condition. The physician
called by the police to examine him testified at trial that the
defendant had refused to submit to a chemical test. While recognizing that section 70(5) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law authorized the admission into evidence of the results of a BAC test, the
Appellate Divisiofi, Third Department emphasized that "[tihe
courts of this state have long and consistently held that under our
self-incrimination laws the receipt of evidence in a criminal trial
of defendant's complete silence or refusal to answer is reversible
error. '7 By virtue of the Court of Appeals' affirmance in
Stratton,7 the rule was established that refusal to submit to a
chemical test may not be introduced as evidence in a criminal
proceeding.
The inconvenient practice of requiring blood samples to test
BAC generated a host of problems. When and how to take the
sample and the permissible use of the results became nettlesome
issues in the period of the 1950's.
Under the statute, the physical sample had to be withdrawn
within two hours.7" This was construed to mean that the two hour
period commenced from the time of arrest 79 and not from the time
of the offense."0 The results were deemed inadmissible where the
arrest followed the withdrawing of the sample and the unconscious defendant had no knowledge of the test and, of course, had
not consented."
When the people introduced evidence of blood test results at
75. 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362 (3d Dep't 1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 664, 133
N.E.2d 516, 150 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1956).
76. Id. at 326, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 365. The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial
judge's instruction to the jury that the evidence of refusal could be admitted for a limited
purpose: to show the extent of the physician's examination of defendant and to bear upon

the credibility and weight of the physician's testimony.
77. 1 N.Y.2d 664, 133 N.E.2d 516, 150 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1956).
78. For text of statute, see note 110 infra.
79. See People v. Wyner, 207 Misc. 673, 142 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Westchester County Ct.

1955).
80. See People v. Dietz, 5 Misc.2d 517, 153 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Monroe County Ct. 1956).
81. See People v. McConnell, 19 Misc.2d 1050, 192 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Steuben County
Ct. 1959); cf. People v. Biester, 24 App. Div.2d 1021, 266 N.Y.S.2d 46 (2d Dep't 1965).
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trial, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the
chain of possession.8 2 If the blood sample passed through many
hands, proof of its identity and unchanged condition was difficult.8 3 The amount of time which elapsed from taking the sample

to delivery to a chemist also became a factor.84 Further, the procedure employed in obtaining a sample was scrutinized; e.g., the
use of alcohol to cleanse the driver's arm was a decisive factor in
one unsuccessful prosecution."
While problems of chain of possession and medical technique could be avoided by use of breath rather than blood samples, the prosecution could not satisfy its burden by simply submitting the results registered on an instrument such as the Harger Drunkometer. 8 The court required expert testimony to lay a
foundation for admissibility of the test results and the test had
to be administered by a qualified person." As a consequence,
trials consumed many hours.
In the absence of or in addition to BAC results, what allegations were sufficient in an information and what proof was persuasive at trial to establish the driver's intoxication? Informations" were held sufficient where they averred weaving, staggering, alcohol on breath" and where the driver involved in an accident admitted to drinking." An inference of intoxication could
be drawn from the facts set forth and the violation charged."
But when the defendant's abnormal conduct might be attributable to injuries suffered in an accident," or when the fact of his
82. See People v. Lesinski, 10 Misc. 2d 254, 171 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1958); People v. Wyner, 207 Misc. 673, 142 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Westchester County Ct. 1955).
83. See People v. Sansalone, 208 Misc. 491, 146 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Westchester County
Ct. 1955).
84. See People v. Lesinski, 10 Misc.2d 254, 171 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1958).
85. It was argued that the alcohol, if not entirely removed, might affect the results.
People v. Douglas, 16 Misc.2d 181, 183 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Jefferson County Ct. 1959).
86. The courts accepted the results of the Harger Drunkometer test as accurate and
scientific in People v. Coppock, 206 Misc. 89, 133 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Spec. Sess. N.Y.C. 1954);
People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Spec. Sess. N.Y.C. 1954).
87. See People v. Davidson, 5 Misc.2d 699, 702, 152 N.Y.S.2d 762, 765 (Monroe
County Ct. 1956).
88. See notes 277-78 infra.
89. See People v. Pullman, 3 Misc.2d 188, 148 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Saratoga County Ct.
1956).
90. See People v. Sorg, 3 Misc.2d 437, 149 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Rochester City Ct. 1956).
91. See People v. Bachner, 17 Misc.2d 139, 185 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Jefferson County Ct.
1959); People v. Lottko, 10 Misc.2d 46, 174 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Suffolk County Ct. 1957).
92. See People v. Carter, 5 Misc.2d 214, 164 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Wayne County Ct. 1956).
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operation of a vehicle was supported only by an ambiguous admission,93 informations were held insufficient.
At trial, the jury was permitted to consider the testimony of
witnesses describing defendant's appearance and behavior94 and
identifying the defendant as the operator of a motor vehicle.9
And clearly, a conviction stood on solid ground where, as in one
case, the proof disclosed a traffic infraction, collision, testimony
that defendant smelled of alcohol, swayed, slurred his words and
registered a BAC of .22.96
Evidentiary problems were not confined to DWI criminal
trials but also infiltrated administrative (article 78) proceedings
to review revocation of drivers' licenses. These are considered in
detail in subsequent portions of the study97 but the debate concerning what consituted an actual refusal by the defendant to
98
submit to a chemical test is reflected in some cases of the 1950's.
III.

RECODIFICATION OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW,

ELABORATION OF THE LAW,

1959:

1959-66

Under the sponsorship of the Temporary State Commission
on Coordination of State Activities, the Vehicle and Traffic Law
of 1929 underwent a major reorganization. A recodified Vehicle
and Traffic Law was enacted by the New York Legislature in
1959, to take effect on October 1, 1960.11 Concurrently, Governor
Rockefeller announced the Mobilization of State Agencies to
Reduce Traffic Accidents and Fatalities. To emphasize the gravity of the problem of the drinking driver, the Governor cited statistics from a study in Westchester County which revealed that
in 49 percent of fatal one-car accidents, the operator had been
intoxicated (BAC of .15 or higher) and in an additional 20 percent
of the cases, the driver had consumed enough alcohol to impair
his ability to drive.' °
93. See People v. Hemleb, 4 App. Div.2d 878, 166 N.Y.S.2d 837 (2d Dep't 1957).

94. See People v. Kessler, 16 Misc.2d 179, 183 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Jefferson County Ct.
1959).
95. See People v. Pieniazek, 17 Misc.2d 323, 186 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Schenectady County
Ct. 1959).
96. People v. Criss, 7 Misc. 2d 409, 169 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Westchester County Ct. 1957).
97. See notes 153-58; and accompanying text infra.

98. See, e.g., Clancy v. Kelley, 7 App. Div.2d 820, 180 N.Y.S.2d 923 (3d Dep't 1958);
Taylor v. Kelly, 5 App. Div.2d 931, 171 N.Y.S.2d 909 (3d Dep't 1958); Scott v. Kelly, 5
App. Div.2d 859, 171 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep't 1958).

99. Ch. 775, § 2015 [1959] Laws of N.Y. 2043.
100. PUBLic PAPERS OF GOVERNOR NELSON A. RocKEFLER 883 (1959).
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Section 1192 of the new law set forth the basic definition of
the offense of driving while intoxicated:''
Whoever operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an
intoxicated condition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Whoever
operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated
condition after having been convicted of operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated condition shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be punishable by imprisonment for
not less than sixty days nor more than two years or by a fine of
not less than two hundred dollars nor more than two thousand
dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.
Upon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of acts
alleged to have been committed by any person arrested for operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated condition, the court may admit evidence of the amount of alcohol
in the defendant's blood taken within two hours of the time of
the arrest, as shown by a medical or chemical analysis of his
breath, blood, urine, or saliva. For the purposes of this section
(a) evidence that there was, at the time, five-hundredths of one
per centum, or less, by weight of alcohol in his blood, is prima
facie evidence that the defendant was not in an intoxicated
condition; (b) evidence that there was, at the time, more than
five-hundredths of one per centum and less than fifteenhundredths of one per centum by weight of alcohol in his blood
is relevant evidence, but it is not to be given prima facie effect
in indicating whether or not the defendant was in an intoxicated
condition; (c) evidence that there was, at the time, fifteenhundredths of one per centum, or more, by weight of alcohol in
his blood, may be admitted as prima facie evidence that the
defendant was in an intoxicated condition.
The substantive provisions of the prior statute remained unchanged. Thus, driving while intoxicated, a misdemeanor as a
first offense, was elevated to a felony where the driver had a
previous DWI conviction. Punishment for the felony was sixty
days to two years imprisonment and/or a fine of $200 to $2000.
The same time limit for administering the chemical
test-within two hours of arrest-was retained in the statute. The
evidentiary significance of specified blood alcohol levels continued to be: (a) .05 or less-prima facie evidence of no intoxication;
(b) more than .05 but less than .15-relevant but not prima facie
101. Ch. 775, § 1192, [1959] Laws of N.Y. 2008, amending ch. 726, § 1 [1941] Laws
of N.Y. 1623.
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evidence of intoxication; and (c) .15 or more-prima facie evi10 2
dence of intoxication.
It is important to bear this statutory definition in mind as
the subsequent evolution of the offense unfolds. The criteria
legislated in 1959 represented a base line expressing earlier attitudes toward the problem of the drinking driver. The legislature
did not address itself at this time to the driver who was impaired
but solely to the one who was intoxicated. In the following decade
and a half, section 1192 of the law has been subjected to several
substantial amendments'"3 reflecting a mounting concern and
frustration on the part of the public and the government.
Section 1193104 provided that a peace officer could arrest
without a warrant a person violating section 1192. This was
amended the following year to substitute police officer for peace
officer.'1"
The implied consent law became section 1194 of the 1959
statute.' 6 The chemical test to which any operator of a motor
102. It was held reversible error to charge that the percentages of blood alcohol set
forth in section 1192(3) were "conclusive." They were "mere presumptions." People v.
Tannenbaum, 40 Misc.2d 5, 242 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Suffolk County Ct. 1963).
103. See notes 110, 134, 188, 195, 204 infra and accompanying text.
104. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person, in case of a
violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two, which in fact has been committed, though not in his presence, when he has reasonable cause to believe that
the violation was committed by such person.
Ch. 775, § 1193, [1959] Laws of N.Y. 2008.
105. Ch. 300, § 53 [1960] Laws of N.Y. 1151, amending ch. 775, § 1193, [1959] Laws
of N.Y. 2008.
106. Ch. 775, § 1194, [1959] Laws of N.Y. 2008-09:
1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle in this state
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood,
urine, or saliva for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood
provided that such test is administered at the direction of a police officer having
reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been driving in an intoxicated
condition and in accordance with the rules and regulations established by the
police force of which he is a member. If such person having been placed under
arrest and having thereafter been requested to submit to such chemical test
refuses to submit to such chemical test the test shall not be given but the
commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any non-resident
operating privilege; provided, however, the commissioner shall grant such person an opportunity to be heard but a license, permit or non-resident operating
privilege may, upon the basis of a sworn report of the police officer that he had
reasonable grounds to believe such arrested person to have been driving in an
intoxicated condition and that said person had refused to submit to such test,
be temporarily suspended without notice pending the determination upon any
such hearing. The provisions of subdivisions five and six of section five hundred
ten of this law shall be applicable to revocations under this section.
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vehicle or motorcycle in New York was deemed to lave consented
was one to determine the alcoholic content of his blood by use of
a breath, blood, urine or saliva sample. If after arrest and request
to submit to such test, the driver refused, "the Commissioner
shall revoke his license." [Emphasis added]. The section required that the driver be given an opportunity to be heard, but
his license could be temporarily suspended without notice prior
to a hearing.
The important revocation and suspension provisions of the
predecessor statute were incorporated in section 510 of the new
Vehicle and Traffic Law of 1959.101 Mandatory revocation of a
driver's license was prescribed where the licensee was convicted
of violating section 1192 (DWI). ' No new license could be issued
to a convicted motorist for at least six months, and where a person had been twice convicted of DWI and personal injury resulted
2. Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such test
shall be made available to him.
3. a. No person except a physician acting at the request of a police officer
shall be entitled to withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine, saliva
or breath specimen.
b. No physician shall be sued or held liable for any act done or omitted
in the course of withdrawing blood at the request of a police officer pursuant to
this section.
c. Any person who may have a cause of action arising from the withdrawal
of blood as aforesaid, for which no personal liability exists under paragraph b
of this subdivision, may maintain such action against the state if the physician
acted at the request of a police officer employed by the state, or against the
appropriate political subdivision of the state if the physician acted at the request of a police officer employed by a political subdivision of the state. No
action shall be maintained pursuant to this paragraph unless notice of claim is
duly filed or served in compliance with law.
d. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this subdivision, an action
may be maintained by the state or a political subdivision thereof against a
physician for whose act or omission the state or the political subdivision has
been held liable under this subdivision, to recover damages, not exceeding the
amount awarded to the claimant, that may have been sustained by the state or
the political subdivision by reason of gross negligence or bad faith on the part
of such physician.
4. The person tested shall be permitted to have a physician of his own
choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the one administered at the
direction of the police officer.
107. Ch. 775, § 510, [1959] Laws of N.Y. 1979 (formerly codified as N.Y. VEH. &
TAP. LAW § 510), amending ch. 522, § 1 [1958] Laws of N.Y. 1275.
108. Ch. 775, § 510(2)(b), [1959] Laws of N.Y. 1980. If the person convicted was not
a resident of New York, this section prescribed revocation of the privilege to operate a
motor vehicle in New York. Id. § 510(2)(c).
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from each instance of such driving the law prohibited issuance of
a new license.' 9
Amendments of Vehicle and Traffic Law of 1959
No sooner had the 1959 Vehicle and Traffic Law been enacted than amendments commenced apace. It was as though the
legislature, once aware of what the law was, decided its inadequacy and inefficacy and determined to move forward with initiative. Assuredly, it could not be content or convinced that the
established approach to the menace of the drinking driver met its
public obligation to deter the intoxicated driver and to diminish
the incidence of traffic fatalities and serious injuries.
Accordingly, in 1960, the legislature revised section 1192, the
basic DWI provision, to introduce a new offense, "driving while
ability to operate is impaired by the consumption of alcohol."
Driving while impaired was to be a traffic infraction. Prima facie
evidence of impairment was established by a level of .10 of one
percent by weight of alcohol in the driver's blood.' 0 The previous
109. Id. § 510 (5).
110. Ch. 184, § 1, [1960] Laws of N.Y. 948, amending ch. 775, § 1192, [1959] Laws
of N.Y. 2008:
Operating motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated condition or while
ability to operate is impaired by the consumption of alcohol.
1. Whoever operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle while his ability to operate
such motor vehicle or motorcycle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol
shall be guilty of a traffic infraction. No conviction shall be had under this
subdivision after entry of a plea of not guilty unless it is shown by means of a
chemical test administered undersection eleven hundred ninety-four that there
was, within two hours of the defendant's arrest, ten-hundredths of one per
centum or more by weight of alcohol in his blood.
2. Whoever operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated
condition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Whoever operates a motor vehicle
or motorcycle while in an intoxicated condition after having been convicted of
operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated condition shall
be guilty of a felony and shall be punishable by imprisonment for not less than
sixty days nor more than two years or by a fine of not less than two hundred
dollars nor more than two thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and
fine.
3. Upon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have
been committed by any person arrested for operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated condition or while ability to operate is impaired
by the consumption of alcohol, the court may admit evidence of the amount of
alcohol in the defendant's blood taken within two hours of the time of the arrest,
as shown by a medical or chemical analysis of his breath, blood, urine or saliva.
For the purposes of this section (a) evidence that there was, at the time, fivehundredths of one per centum, or less, by weight of alcohol in his blood is prima
facie evidence that the defendant was not in an intoxicated condition; (b) evi-
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designation of driving while intoxicated as a misdemeanor was
continued in subdivision 2 of the revised section 1192 and the
1959 definitions of the evidentiary significance of blood alcohol
levels remained indentical but were now supplemented by the
new classification, driving while impaired (.10 BAC).
Concomitantly, the maximum penalty upon conviction for
DWI was increased from the previous maximum imprisonment of
thirty days or fine of $100 (or both) to maximum imprisonment
of one year or fine of $500 (or both)." For the purpose of raising
a second DWI to a felony, the prior conviction was required to be
112
within a ten year period.
Another amendment of 1960 extended to hospitals"' the
immunity from liability accorded physicians under section
1194(b) for acts done or omitted in the course of withdrawing a

blood sample. Some institutions prior to this amendment had
refused to cooperate with the police from fear of civil liability.
Proving the Case under the 1959-1960 Statute
One of the first cases to arise under the new driving-whileimpaired provision, People v. Wagonseller,'" considered the novel
issue of the DWAI driver who refused a blood test. Revocation of

his license, on the ground of refusal, constituted a harsher penalty than the sixty-day suspension following conviction under
section 1192(1). The court dismissed the information on the
ground that the statute clearly forbade a DWAI conviction after
dence that there was, at the time, more than five-hundredths of one per centum
and less than fifteen-hundredths of one per centum by weight of alcohol in his
blood is relevant evidence, but it is not to be given prima facie effect, in indicating whether or not the defendant was in an intoxicated condition; (c) evidence
that there was, at the time, ten-hundredths of one per centum, or more, by
weight of alcohol in his blood, may be admitted as prima facie evidence that
the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle was impaired
by the consumption of alcohol; (d) evidence that there was, at the time, fifteenhundredths of one per centum, or more, by weight of alcohol in his blood, may
be admitted as prima facie evidence that the defendant was in an intoxicated
condition.
111. Ch. 749, § 1, [1960] Laws of N.Y. 2062, amending ch. 775, § 1192 [1959] Laws
of N.Y. 2008.
112. Id. For comments on the 1960 amendments see Governor's Memoranda on Bills
Approved, ch. 749, 1960 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 539.
113. Ch. 896, § 2, [1960] Laws of N.Y. 2285, amending ch. 775, § 1194, [1959] Laws
of N.Y. 2007-09. See also Memorandum of Assemblyman Leo P. Noonan, 1960 N.Y.S. LEo.
ANN. 353.

114. 25 Misc.2d 217, 205 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Plattsburgh City Ct. 1960).
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entry of a not guilty plea unless a chemical test showed .10 or
more BAC." 5
The main evidentiary issues of this period concerned scientific standards for the chemical test, the extent to which the
doctor-patient privilege precluded a physician's testimony of defendant's intoxication, establishing the chain of possession for a
blood sample and the time sequence of arrest in relation to obtaining a blood sample, and circumstantial proof that defendant
was operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
In People v. McFarren,"6 the court held that conviction
under sections 1192(1) and 1194(1),"17 required the prosecution to
establish that experts relied upon to analyze and interpret test
results possessed knowledge and experience. Mere familiarity
18
with the mechanical procedures involved would not suffice.
In People v. Cook," 9 a physician treated an accident victim
in his office. Subsequently the police arrived and with the driver's
consent, the physician withdrew a blood sample. The court held
that the testimony of the physician relating to obtaining the
blood sample was not barred by the doctor-patient privilege since
that relationship had terminated before the police arrived and the
defendant was no longer under treatment. 2 0 But in People v.
Singer,' the doctor-patient privilege precluded testimony on the
issue of intoxication based on the treating physician's observations of the defendant's mental and physical condition.
Courts did not diverge from the principle that in order to
admit the results of a blood test into evidence, the chain of possession must be clearly established.' 2 An obvious case for excluding blood test results was People v. Pfendler23 where the sample
115. See also People v. Bronzino, 25 App. Div.2d 685, 269 N.Y.S.2d 83 (2d Dep't
1966).
116. 28 Misc.2d 320, 222 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Washington County Ct. 1961).
117. See text of statute at notes 106 & 110 supra.
118. People v. Morgan, 236 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Suffolk County Ct. 1962).
119. 25 Misc.2d 722, 205 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Jefferson County Ct. 1966).
120. Id. at 725, 205 N.Y.S.2d at 493. See also text at note 20 supra.
121. 236 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Suffolk County Ct. 1962).
122. See People v. McFarren, 28 Misc.2d 320, 222 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Washington County
Ct. 1961); People v. McAnarney, 28 Misc.2d 778, 210 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Schuyler County Ct.
1961) (where the blood sample was lost). But where the blood was placed in a vial, sealed,
put in a container for mailing, kept locked in a strong box (to which only the State Trooper
had a key) until it was dispatched by registered mail the next day to the police laboratory,
the Court of Appeals held that a proper chain of identification had been established.
People v. Malone, 14 N.Y.2d 8, 197 N.E.2d 189, 247 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1964). See also People
v. Goedkoop, 202 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Westchester County Ct. 1960).
123. 29 Misc.2d 339, 212 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Oneida County Ct. 1961).
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was left in an unsecured place for twelve days before transferral
to a laboratory.
In People v. Ashby,' the time interval between taking a
blood sample and arresting the accused driver seemed to pose a
difficult question for the court. The seriously injured driver was
taken to a hospital. While there, blood was withdrawn, and three
days later he was arrested. Since the plain language of the statute

prescribed that the BAC test must be administered within two
hours of arrest ' 2 and since earlier cases had settled the necessity
for compliance with the statute, 128 the judge in Ashby need not
have encountered this issue as novel or difficult.'
Proof that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle is an
essential element of the DWI offense. Where defendant admitted

operation but his BAC test was close to the .15 prima facie DWI
level, the court required additional testimony relating to defendant's condition, the position of the vehicle, etc. ' In People v.
Fox, 29 defendant admitted operating a motor vehicle, drinking
and striking a parked car. But after conviction, he contended that
the People had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
124. 31 Misc.2d 707, 220 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Oneida County Ct. 1961).
125. Ch. 184, § 1, [1960] Laws of N.Y. 2007.
126. See People v. Dietz, 5 Misc. 2d 517, 153 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Monroe County Ct. 1956);
People v. Wyner, 207 Misc. 673, 142 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Westchester County Ct. 1955).
127. The question in People v. Ashby was whether the judge should grant a certificate
of removal from the Court of Special Sessions for prosecution by indictment. The basic
case defining the grounds for granting such a certificate is People v. Rosenberg, 59 Misc.
342, 112 N.Y.S. 316 (Ct. of Gen'l Sess. N.Y. County 1908) (intricate questions of fact;
difficult question of law; property right; precedental nature of decision; exceptional case
and defendant cannot have a fair trial in the court of first instance). In People v. Bellia,
11 N.Y.2d 852, 182 N.E.2d 283, 227 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1962), the court resolved the problem
by finding that an arrest had preceded administration of the blood test. But see People
v. Lovejoy, 66 Misc.2d 1003, 323 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Tompkins County Ct. 1971) where defendant claimed that a blood test was not made within two hours of arrest and the recollection
of the physician and arresting officer and the records were unclear. The court granted
defendant's application for prosecution by indictment since difficult questions of fact and
law were involved.
128. See, e.g., People v. La Rose, 31 Misc.2d 800, 219 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Jefferson County
Ct. 1961). But see People v. Matthews, 11 App. Div.2d 784, 205 N.Y.S.2d 26 (2d Dep't
1960); People v. Hellwig, 22 Misc.2d 286, 199 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Schenectady County Ct.
1960); People v. Butts, 21 Misc.2d 799, 201 N.Y.S.2d 926 (City Ct. Poughkeepsie 1960).
See also People v. Shields, 38 Misc.2d 279, 239 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Washington County Ct.
1962) (blood test results were insufficient for a DWI conviction and observational testimony was lacking); People v. Pieniazek, 17 Misc.2d 323, 186 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Schenectady
County Ct. 1959) (defendant did not admit operation but such fact was established by
the prosecution from testimony of witnesses).
129. 34 Misc.2d 830, 229 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Monroe County Ct. 1962).
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was the driver of the vehicle 130 in which he was found slumped
over the front seat. The evidence, including testimony of a witness on the scene was held sufficient by the court. Parenthetically, the defendant also maintained he was so intoxicated that
he was incapable of driving. Although a novel argument, perhaps
his contention possessed substance, for defense counsel described
defendant as "paralyzed" and a urine sample taken within two
hours of arrest established a BAC of .346!
What constitutes sufficient evidence of "operation" has continued to be an issue in more recent cases. In People v.
Hoffman, 3 ' the court dismissed the information on the ground
that the vehicle the defendant was alleged to have operated was
inoperable. But in People v. Merriott,3 2 operation was established when defendant was found asleep behind the steering
wheel with the car engine running. It is safe to conclude that
where a driver is found slumped over the wheel of a vehicle and
the engine is running, the court will find no difficulty in inferring
33
the fact of operation.
Introduction of BAC Standardfor Drivers under 21 Years of Age
In 1963, the legislature directed special attention to minors
as drinking drivers. Section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
was amended in that year to set a standard for operators under
130. Such finding was required by ch. 442, [1881] Laws of N.Y. 601, (codified as
N.Y. Code of Criminal Proc. § 395).
131. 53 Misc.2d 1010, 280 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1967).
132. 37 App. Div.2d 868, 325 N.Y.S.2d 177 (3d Dep't 1971). The court remarked:
The defendant's presence alone behind the steering wheel of the automobile in
an intoxicated condition with the motor running in a remote area where the car
had been parked with the engine stopped allowed the jury to draw the fair
inference that he had started the engine intending to go home and this constituted operation within the intendment of the statute. The evidence, both direct
and circumstantial, was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty.
133. Prudhomme v. Hults, 27 App. Div.2d 234, 278 N.Y.S.2d 67 (3d Dep't 1967).
Operating a motor vehicle is considered by the courts as a broader tem than driving.
134. Ch. 869, § 2, [1963] Laws of N.Y. 2777, (codified as N.Y. VEH. & TwAF. LAW §
1192(4)):
4. Upon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to
have been committed by any person under the age of twenty-one years, who is
arrested for operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated
condition, or while ability to operate is impaired by consumption of alcohol, the
court may admit evidence of the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood
taken within two hours of the time of the arrest, as shown by a medical or
chemical analysis of his breath, blood, urine or saliva, for the purposes of this
section (a) evidence that there was, at the time, more than five-hundredths of
one per centum, or more, by weight of alcohol in his blood may be admitted as
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twenty-one years of age.rs A BAC of more than .05 became prima
facie evidence of impairment for a minor driver. A BAC of .15 or
more was prima facie evidence of intoxication for minor and adult
drivers. Supporting the change in the law were memoranda of the
Governor1' 5 and the Joint Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicle and Traffic Safety. 3 ' Proponents of this legislation relied on
statistics that younger operators caused a disproportionately high
number of accidents and advocated that the New York legislature
should be the first to translate this concern into a special statutory provision applicable to drivers under twenty-one. The fate of
section 1192(4) is discussed in the summary of more recent statu13 7
tory amendments.
Criminal Negligence and Driving While Intoxicated
Where defendant was not charged with DWI but with criminal negligence or with a combination of criminal negligence 38 and
reckless driving,' 31 the courts dismissed indictments or reversed
convictions based on the results of blood tests taken before arrest
or without actual consent of the driver. In People v. McConnell, 4 '
a blood sample was extracted from defendant while he was unconscious following the accident in which he allegedly caused the
death of two persons. An arrest was made after the return of the
indictment. Testimony before the grand jury that defendant's
BAC was .31 was "illegal" and the indictment dismissed for failure to comply with the statutory requirements that arrest and
consent precede a blood test. 4 '
In People v. Young,"' the defendant, indicted for criminal
prima facie evidence that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle or
motorcycle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol; (b) evidence that there
was, at the time, fifteen-hundredths of one per centum or more by weight of
alcohol in his blood, may be admitted as prima facie evidence that the defendant was in an intoxicated condition.
135. See Governor's Memorandum on Bills Approved, 1963 N.Y.S. LEo. ANN. 470.
The Governor stated that a .05 level signified a greater degree of impairment in those
under twenty-one than in older operators. Id. at 471.
136. See Memoranda of Joint Legislative Comm'n on Motor Vehicles and Traffic
Safety, 1963 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 384. The memorandum stated that "a massive crackdown
on driving while under the influence of alcohol is requisite to a reduction of highway
fatalities and series [sic] injuries."
137. See notes 188-89, 204 infra and accompanying text.
138. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1053-a (McKinney 1967).
139. Ch. 775, [1959] Laws of N.Y. 2007.
140. 19 Misc.2d 1050, 192 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Steuben County Ct. 1959).
141. Id. at 1052, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 179-80.
142. 42 Misc.2d 540, 248 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Westchester County Ct. 1964).
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negligence, moved to suppress evidence of the results of a blood
test performed while he was unconscious. He urged several
grounds for suppression,"' among them violation of the statutory
requirements for a valid blood alcohol test' and of the federal" 5
and state 41 constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable
search and seizure. He was not under arrest when the blood sample was withdrawn. Furthermore, he had not (and could not have)
given consent to the test. The court rejected any construction of
section 1194 which would apply the implied consent doctrine to
ratify the admissibility of evidence in a trial for criminal negligence.' 4 7 The operator of a vehicle, stated the court, is deemed to
consent to a blood test only for the purpose of proceedings by the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for revocation of his license following an arrest and refusal to submit to such test.'
A separate issue in prosecutions for criminal negligence arose
where results of blood alcohol tests were introduced at trial and
the judge charged that a .15 blood alcohol level consituted a
presumption of intoxication. Such an instruction required reversal of a conviction.' Similarly, it was improper to charge that a
BAC of .15 or more was conclusive of intoxication, with the burden upon defendant to rebut the evidence."' In People v. Leis,'
the Fourth Department underscored the distinction between the
crimes of criminal negligence and driving while intoxicated. The
court held that the evidentiary significance of the blood alcohol
percentages prescribed in the DWI statute were not presumptions
2
transferable to establish violation of the penal law.1
Issues in Article 78 Proceedings
Defendants raised a variety of grounds in the early 1960's to
challenge the Commissioner's revocation of licenses. The validity
143. Id. at 542, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 289.

144. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney 1970).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
146. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
147. But see text accompanying notes 165-66 infra.
148. People v. Young, 42 Misc.2d 540, 544, 248 N.Y.S.2d 287, 291. But see People v.
Biester, 24 App. Div.2d 1021, 266 N.Y.S.2d 46 (2d Dep't 1965).
Where defendant was charged both with criminal negligence and driving while intoxicated, the results of a blood alcohol test were admissible as evidence on the DWI charge.
People v. O'Donnell, 30 App. Div.2d 731, 291 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dep't 1968).
149. People v. Manning, 7 App. Div.2d 1007, 184 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2d Dep't 1959).
150. People v. Guilford, 20 App. Div.2d 192, 245 N.Y.S.2d 781 (4th Dep't 1964).
151. 13 App. Div.2d 22, 213 N.Y.S.2d 138 (4th Dep't 1961).
152. Id.
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of the driver's arrest and whether or not he actually refused a
chemical test constituted the most important issues contested. In
Brown v. Hults,13 the question of whether the police had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was intoxicated was answered
affirmatively by the court. The arresting officer's observation of
intoxication was buttressed by an informant's testimony that the
accused had driven behind him bumping his car, by the position
of the two vehicles, by a dent in the bumper of the informant's
car and admissions by the accused that he had been drinking.",
By contrast, the testimony of the arresting officer did not establish a valid arrest where he had not visited the scene of the accident, no other witnesses testified, and the driver offered no admission of drinking.' Instead, the driver's erratic behavior in the
police car could be traced to serious head injuries sustained in the
accident.
What constitutes refusal to submit to a chemical test, after
a valid arrest for driving while intoxicated, engaged the courts in
reviewing revocation of licenses by the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles. In one case,"5 6 the driver initially agreed to a chemical
test. He then requested the opportunity to call his attorney. His
attorney advised him to submit to a blood test. After being transported to a hospital, the driver insisted that his personal physician administer the test but refused to divulge the physician's
name although the police officer was willing to telephone the
operator's physician. The court ruled that while a defendant may
have a test administered by his own physician, in addition to the
test administered at the direction of the police officer, "there is
no requirement that the arrested person's own physician be present." 15 7 The vacillation of the defendant justified a conclusion
that he had refused to submit to a test.'
153. 24 App. Div.2d 1068, 265 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d Dep't 1965).
154. Id. at 1068-69, 265 N.Y.S.2d 726-27. See also Van Wormer v. Tofany, 28 App.
Div.2d 941, 281 N.Y.S.2d 491 (3d Dep't 1967).
155. Burns v. Hults, 20 App. Div.2d 752, 247 N.Y.S.2d 311 (4th Dep't 1964). See also
Beatty v. Hults, 22 App. Div.2d 740, 253 N.Y.S.2d 327 (3d Dep't 1964).
156. Sowa v. Hults, 22 App. Div.2d 730, 253 N.Y.S.2d 294 (3d Dep't 1964).
157. Id. at 731, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 295-96; accord, Shields v. Hults, 26 App. Div.2d 971,
274 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dep't 1966).
158. In Breslin v. Hults, 20 App. Div.2d 790, 248 N.Y.S.2d 70 (2d Dep't 1964), the

driver insisted that his personal physician conduct the test, not merely an additional test.
Such a condition constituted a refusal to submit to the test provided for by the statute,
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1), (3) (McKinney 1970). The Appellate Division upheld

a hearing officer's determination that the driver had refused a test where, following his
initial refusal, he returned to the police station, close to the expiration of the time limit
;i,i
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Amendments of 1966
As previously noted, the legislative elaboration of the DWI
offense in the period immediately following the 1959 recodification of the Vehicle and Traffic Law introduced two major additions. In 1960, the legislature established a new category of proscribed conduct, driving while ability was impaired by alcohol."5
DWAI, a traffic infraction rather than a misdemeanor, required
proof of a chemical test result of .10 or more BAC for conviction. '
The second extension in 1963 created a special standard for drivers under twenty-one years of age; a BAC of more than .05 became prima facie evidence of impairment for the minor driver. 6'
In 1966, a third modification made it a misdemeanor to operate a motor vehicle while the driver's ability was impaired by the
use of drugs.'6 ' By enactment of this new category of criminal
behavior, the legislature recognized the increased use of drugs
and that the drugged as well as the drinking driver menaced the
safety of others. A definition of drugs was incorporated in a new
section 114-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.' 6' The mandatory
license revocation provisions of the law were also amended to
incorporate convictions based on driving while impaired by the
use of drugs.'6 4
The chemical test provision, section 1194, was conformed to
encompass the driving-while-drugged misdemeanor.' 6' The operator of a motor vehicle was henceforth deemed to consent to a
chemical test to determine the drug content of his blood when a
to administer the test; no police officer present was qualified to give a test and, in any
event, the testing apparatus could not be made ready in less than 20 to 25 minutes. Lundin
v. Hults, 29 App. Div.2d 581, 285 N.Y.S.2d 960 (3d Dep't 1967).
159. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1192(1) (McKinney 1970). For text of statute, see note
110 supra. Since DWAI was an offense and not a misdemeanor, a uniform traffic summons
sufficed and a detailed information was not required. People ex reL. Tozzi v. Doherty, 47
Misc.2d 740, 262 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1965).
160. See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
161. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
162. Ch. 963, § 1, [1966] Laws of N.Y. 3270, amending N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
1192(2) (McKinney 1970). See Governor's Memorandum on Bills Approved, 1966 N.Y.
LEG. ANN. 345.

163. Ch. 963, § 4, [1966] Laws of N.Y. 3272, amending N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
114-a (McKinney 1970).
164. Ch. 963, § 2, [1966] Laws of N.Y. 3270, amending N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
510 (6) (McKinney 1970).
165. Ch. 963, § 3, [1966] Laws of N.Y. 3271-72, amending N.Y. VaI. & TAF. LAW
§ 1194(1) (McKinney 1970). Another amendment of 1966 added registered professional
nurses to the category of persons capable of administering a blood test. Ch. 615, § 1,
[1966] Laws of N.Y. 1374.
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police officer had reasonable grounds to believe such person was
driving while his ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by the
use of a drug. 66'
IV.

STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS,

1968-74.

The mid-1960's represent a watershed in the evolution of
legislative and judicial approaches to the offense of driving while
intoxicated. Several reasons support this demarcation. The pace
of amendments quickened due to heightened public concern over
the mounting number of fatal accidents in which alcohol was
involved. Federal legislation reflected a national interest in safety
on the highways." 7 The United States Supreme Court handed
down landmark decisions dealing with the rights of defendants,
including DWI offenders, in criminal prosecutions.' 6 The New
York Legislature, attempting to respond both to the need for
reducing alcohol-related traffic injuries and fatalities, and for
observing the constitutional protection of the accused, honed the
law by a series of refinements.
The chemical test (implied consent law) provision as incorporated in the recodification of 1959,19 prescribed three conditions precedent to revocation of a driver's license by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles: a valid arrest, based on reasonable
grounds to believe the operator of the vehicle was in an intoxicated condition; the driver'srefusal of the request to submit to a
chemical test; and according the driver an opportunity to be
heard with reference to the revocation of his license.' There was
no requirement that the driver be warned of the consequence of
declining the chemical test.
166. The case law pertaining to the crime of driving while impaired by drugs is not
treated in this study, not because it does not constitute a threat of serious dimensions to
the public, but because it imports distinct problems better relegated to a separate
analysis.
167. Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C. 401 (1970); National Traffic & Motor
Vehicles Safety Act, 80 Stat. 718 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
168. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
169. Ch. 775, § 1194, [1959] Laws of N.Y. 2008 (codified as N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1194 (1970)).
170. However, the Commissioner could temporarily suspend a license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege without notice pending the hearing, on the basis of a sworn
police report of reasonable grounds to believe the operator was driving while intoxicated.
The absence of notice poses a previous question of the constitutionality of the statute. The
same provision is retained in the present text of this section. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1194 (McKinney 1960), as amended, N.Y. VEH. & Tas. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp.
1974).
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An amendment of 1968171 cured this omission, at least for-

mally, by forbidding revocation of a license for refusing a chemical test if the driver had not been alerted to such penalty
predicatedon the refusal itself.7 2 The text of section 1194 (1) was
extended
to include the following as a further condition of revoca3
7

tion:

No license, permit or non-resident operating privilege shall be
revoked because of a refusal to submit to such chemical test if
the hearing officer is satisfied that the person requested to submit to such chemical test had not been warned prior to such

refusal to the effect that a refusal to submit to such chemical
test may result in the revocationof his license or operatingprivilege whether or not he is found guilty of the chargefor which he
was arrested.

It is worth noting that the mandated warning expresses a possibility that refusal "may result" in revocation, while the same section
of the law directs that for a refusal the Commissioner "shall revoke" the license or operating privilege. In this inconsistency,
whether intended or fortuitous, the law exhibited its split personality. As noted in the commentary on the implied consent law
adopted in 1953, the Legislature fabricated for New York drivers
a fictitious consent to submit to a chemical test."7 To avoid an
unseemly struggle and total uncooperativeness by the apprehended motorist, the statute permitted a refusal-but one that
boomeranged in revocation of the motorist's license for six
months. In turn, automatic revocation as a consequence of refusal
may have appeared too harsh and absolute when baldly stated;
hence the warning became couched in discretionary language.
Another revision of section 1194(1) in 1968 expressly permitted a motorist to waive his opportunity to be heard on the issue
of license revocation. 7 5 This measure was intended to eliminate
171. Ch.85, § 1194, [1968] Laws of N.Y. 672-73, amending N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1194 (1) (McKinney 1960).

172. It was deemed a matter of fairness, in view of the lack of knowledge on the part
of operators, to forewarn of the serious effect of a refusal. See Motor Transportation
Memorandum, 1968 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 347.
173. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1194(1) (1970), as amended, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1194(1-2) (McKinney 1970).
174. See Part II supra.
175. Commentary, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney 1960). N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1194(1) (McKinney 1970). N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1) (McKinney
1970), amending N.Y. VEH.& TEAF. LAW § 1194(1) (McKinney 1960). "The Commissioner

shall grant such person an opportunity to be heard, unless such opportunity is waived by
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scheduling hearings for operators aware of their violation of the
law and willing to accept the penalty for refusing a chemical
test. 176 The amendment provided no guidance concerning what
criteria would govern the authenticity of the waiver.
The Legislature also inserted a new section in the Vehicle
and Traffic Law forbidding the consumption of alcoholic beverages in a motor vehicle driven on the public highways. 7 7
A substantial legislative innovation in 1968 added an entire
article to the Vehicle and Traffic Law, article 21, authorizing
"experimental driver rehabilitation programs.' 7 In its statement
of purpose the legislature recognized the inadequacy of current
efforts to diminish accidents 79 and authorized the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles to establish rehabilitation programs of from ten
to thirty hours of instruction.'80 Participation in the program was
limited to drivers whose licenses were subject to mandatory or
permissive suspension or revocation and who !were referred by a
driver rehabilitation advisory board.' 1 Article 21 also authorized
driver improvement clinic programs of three hours instruction in
driving techniques and driver attitudes." 2
In 1969, the legislature created a new section 1193-a requiring
operators involved in accidents or violations of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law to submit to a breathtest administered by the police
officer."" If the breath test indicated that the operator had consumed alcohol within three hours of the test, the police could
require the operator to submit to the chemical test specified in
such person. .. ."
176. See Motor Transportation Memorandum, 1968 N.Y. LEG. ANN. 344.
177. Ch. 309, § 1, [1968] Laws of N.Y. 1124, (codified as N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
1227 (McKinney 1970)) which made violation of this proscription a traffic infraction.
178. Ch. 464, § 1, [1968] Laws of N.Y. 1819-22, (codified as N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§§ 520-22 (McKinney 1970)).
179. -Ch. 464, § 520, [1968] Laws of N.Y. 1819-20.
180. Id. § 521.
181. Id. § 521(1)(b), (c).
182. Id. § 521(2).
183. Ch. 1027, § 1, [1969] Laws of N.Y. 2563-64, (codified as N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1193-a (McKinney Supp. 1974)):
Breath tests for operators of certain motor vehicles. Every person operating a
motor vehicle which has been involved in an accident or which is operated in
violation of any of the provisions of this chapter shall, at the request of a police
officer submit to a breath test to be administered by the police officer. If such
test indicates that such operator has consumed alcohol within three hours of the
test, the police officer may require such operator to submit to a chemical test
in the like manner set forth in section eleven hundred ninety-four of this chapter.
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section 1194. Simultaneously, the legislature amended section
1194(1) to provide that a positive result (indicating alcohol consumption within three hours) of the breath test would be an independent ground184 for requesting the driver to submit to a chemical test and upon refusal, a basis for revocation of license.
The preliminary breath test could be administered by the
police officer who apprehended the driver; the device for such test
could be carried in the patrol car for immediate use. The objective was to assist in enforcement of the DWI statute by a procedure described as significantly effective under a parallel British
legislative enactment and endorsed by the Governor and police
of New York.8 5
Other amendments of 1969 clarified the BAC level for conviction of operators under twenty-one years of age,' and enlarged
the category of persons competent to administer a blood test to
include laboratory technicians personally supervised by a physician. 8 '
In 1970, the legislature rewrote section 1192, enacted new
sections 1195 and 1196, and amended section 1194.188 The significant provisions, effective January 1, 1971, may be summarized as

follows:

81

1. The proscription against driving while ability is impaired by
the consumption of alcohol was continued as a traffic infraction.
However, the requirement that for DWAI conviction a chemical
test result of .10 or greater must be obtained was abolished.
2. Operation of a motor vehicle by a person with .15 or more
BAC as established by a chemical test was a misdemeanor.
184. The request to submit to a chemical test could now be made: (a) after arrest on

reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving while intoxicated or impaired by
alcohol or drugs or (b) after the breath test indicated consumption of alcohol. N.Y. VEH.
& Traf. Law § 1194(1), subds. 1, 2 (McKinney 1970), amending N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW
§ 1194(1) (McKinney 1970).
185. See D. Teare, Commentary on Road Safety Act of 1967 (June 6, 1968) (paper
prepared for Conference on Accident Pathology). Governor's Memorandum on Bills Approved, 1969 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 571, citing a study of traffic fatalities by New York State
Police indicating that 44 percent of drivers tested had a BAC of over .15; Memoranda of
Joint Legislative Comm'n on Mass Transportation, 1969 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 476.
186. N.Y. VEH. & Tau. LAW § 1192(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974). See also Memoranda
of Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 1969 N.Y.S. LEO. ANN. 460.
187. N.Y. VEH. & TRAM. LAW § 1194(3)(a)-(e) (McKinney 1970).
188. N.Y. Van. & TRAm. LAW § 1192 (McKinney 1970); Id. §§ 1195-96 (McKinney
Supp. 1974); Id. § 1194(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
189. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1974), amending ch. 275, § 3,
[1970] Laws of N.Y. 1598.
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3. Operation of a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition was in and of itself a misdemeanor.
4. Operation of a m6tor vehicle while impaired by drugs was a
misdemeanor.
5. Violation of 2, 3, 4, [above] became punishable by imprisonment up to one year or by a fine not exceeding $500 or both.
A second offense after a conviction for drunk or drugged driving
within the preceding ten years became a felony with maximum
punishment of two years imprisonment or $2,000 fine or both.
The evidentiary significance to be attached to various BAC
levels was transferred to a new section, 1195,190 providing that a
court shall admit evidence of BAC pursuant to chemical tests
under section 1194 as follows:
.05 BAC or less-prima facie evidence of no impairment, and no
intoxication;
more than .05 and less than .10-prima facie evidence of no
intoxication; relevant evidence of impairment;
.05 or more for driver under 21-prima facie impairment;
.10 or more-prima facie evidence of impairment; relevant evidence of intoxication.
Thus, .05 BAC was prima facie evidence of no impairment,
more than .05 but less than .10 was relevant evidence of impairment for drivers over twenty-one, and .05 or more became prima
facie evidence of impairment for drivers under twenty-one. 1
Operating a motor vehicle with a BAC of .15 or more became a
misdemeanor per se.
The Legislature in 1970 revised the chemical test section,
1194, to prescribe that there was implied consent to a chemical
test administered at the direction of a police officer (1) having
reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving in
"violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninetytwo within two hours after such person had been placed under
arrest for any such violation or (2) within two hours after a breath
test. .. .192

The insertion of a new section 1196 recognized plea bargaining. A defendant charged with intoxication or .15 BAC could be
190. N.Y. Vas,. & TRAF. LAw § 1195 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
191. For commentary on these provisions, see Governor's Memoranda, 1970 N.Y.S.
LEG. ANN. 364, 482. For comparison with 1959 statute, see text accompanying notes 10102 supra.
192. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1194(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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convicted of driving while ability was impaired by consumption
of alcohol (DWAI).5 3
In summary, the amendments of 1969 and 1970 redrafted the
piecemeal revisions of sections 1192 and 1194 since the recodification of the Vehicle and Traffic Law in 1959, introduced the preliminary breath test, recognized plea bargaining and ventured
into a collateral arena-rehabilitation. As to the latter, only the
framework of a program was sketched in the statute.
In rewriting the basic definitional section, 1192, in 1970, the
Legislature incorporated the innovations of 1966: DWAI as a
traffic infraction, and driving while impaired by drugs as a misdemeanor. But the threshold BAC for intoxication remained constant at .15. The legislature appeared unready to move toward a
stricter standard. At the same time, the evidentiary counterparts
for the various offenses proscribed in section 1192 became increasingly detailed. The unduly complicated strata of BAC levels were
probably intended to make proof more certain. But by directing
that certain percentages of alcohol in the blood were "relevant"
evidence, little was accomplished, for proof still rested on a variety of observational data, some reliable and some not. The later
simplification of the chemical test evidence section, 1195, may be
interpreted as a recognition of the futility of the statutory detail
which marked the law's development in the decade following recodification.
In 1971, however, the Legislature adopted a new direction by
lowering the prima facie standards for intoxication and impairment. Instead of the .15 BAC level which had remained constant
for all of the earlier development of the law,' 4 the Legislature now
established .12 of one percent by weight of alcohol in the blood
as the threshold standard for intoxication.19 ' Separate BAC scales
for drivers under twenty-one were eliminated. ' The Legislature
simultaneously reduced existing BAC levels admissible as evidence of intoxication or impairment:
193. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1196 (McKinney Supp. 1974):

Conviction for different charge. A driver may be convicted of a violation of
subdivisions one, two or three of section eleven hundred ninety-two, notwithstanding that the charge laid before the court alleged a violation of subdivision
two or three of section eleven hundred ninety-two, and regardless of whether or
not such conviction is based on a plea of guilty.
194. See notes 18 & 102 supra and accompanying text.
195. Ch. 495, § 1, [1971] Laws of N.Y. 1398-99.
196. Ch. 495, § 3, [1971] Laws of N.Y. 1399.
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(1) more than .05 but less than .08 [formerly .10]-prima
facie evidence of no intoxication; relevant evidence of impairment;
(2) .08 or more-prima facie evidence of impairment; relevant
evidence of intoxication.' 7
There was concern in the legislature that only a small proportion of arrests were for driving while impaired. Lowering the impairment standard from .10 to .08 might encourage police officers
to apprehend more drivers in this category since the chances of
making a "good arrest" increased as the required BAC levels were
decreased. At the same time, there was official support for lowering the presumptive level of intoxication to .10,198 a standard
advocated by some specialists here and abroad and adopted by
an increasing number of other states.
Other statutory modifications of 1971 concerned some details
09
of the preliminary breath test 99 and the chemical test sections"
which require no comment except to note one change. Henceforth, a driver's license could be temporarily suspended based
upon a verified, rather than sworn report of the police officer that
he had reasonable grounds to believe the person arrested was
driving while intoxicated.2"' According to the official view, expedience could be served by simple verification without prejudicing
202
the rights of defendants.
In 1972, the Legislature of New York finally acceded to the
DWI standard in force in almost all the other states.0 3 It revised
197. Ch. 495, §§ 2, 4, [1971] Laws of N.Y. 1399.
198. See Memorandum from Sen. Caemmerer, 1971 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 466, citing
NAT'L HIGHWAY SAFETY BuREAu, ALCOHOL IN RELATION TO HIGHWAY SAFETY.

199. N.Y. VEH. & TRAM. LAW § 1193-a (McKinney Supp. 1974). See Memoranda, 1971
N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 454.
200. N.Y. VEH. & TRaA. LAW § 1194 (9) (McKinney Supp. 1974):

9. The department of health shall issue and file rules and regulations
approving satisfactory techniques or methods, to ascertain the qualifications
and competence of individuals to conduct and supervise chemical analyses of a
person's blood, urine, breath or saliva. If the analyses were made by an individual possessing a permit issued by the department of health, this shall be pre.
sumptive evidence that the examination was properly given. The provisions of
this subdivision do not prohibit the introduction as evidence of an analysis made
by an individual other than a person possessing a permit issued by the department of health.
201. N.Y. VEH. & TRu. LAW § 1194(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
202. See Governor's Memorandum, 1971 N.Y.S. LEG, ANN. 464.
203. See Memoranda of Sen. Caemmerer, 1972 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 288.
204. N.Y. VEH. & Tan. LAW § 1192 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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section 1192 (2) to read:" 4
No person shall operate a motor vehicle while he has .10 of one

per centum or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown
by chemical analysis ...

Sections 1192 and 1195 in combination, as of this writing,
205
provide:
.10 or more-a misdemeanor per se;
.05 or less-prima facie evidence that operator was not impaired
or intoxicated;
more than .07 but less than .10-prima facie evidence that operator was not intoxicated but prima facie evidence of impairment.

The specific standards for drivers under twenty-one have
now been deleted, thus simplifying somewhat the complex provi-

sions governing evidentiary significance of chemical test results.
The Legislature in 1972 enacted an additional requirement
affecting the revocation of a license for refusal to submit to a
chemical test. As of September 1, 1972, it became necessary for
the police officer under whose direction the driver was requested
to submit to a chemical test to forward to the Commissioner a
report of the driver's refusal within seventy-two hours. 08 Adding
this procedural detail provided yet another illustration of the
legislature's repeated attempts to infuse the implied consent law
with constitutional legitimacy.
A subsequent revision in 1973 of this same section, 1194 (2),
resulted in the following text:0 '
If such person having been placed under arrest or after a
breath test indicates the presence of alcohol in his system and
205. N.Y. VEH. & TRA". LAW § 1195 (2) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1974). The same
amendment deleted § 1195 (2) (c), (d).
206. Ch. 449, § 1, [1972] Laws of N.Y. 1742.
207. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974). For comment on this
amendment see notes 248-49 infra and accompanying text.
Other amendments of the Vehicle & Traffic Law effected by the Legislature in 1973
will not be discussed. Those which have some relevance to the DWI and DWAI offenses
are:
1. Definition of Drugs. N.Y. VEH. & TiAF. LAW § 114(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974),
amending ch. 963, § 4, [1966] Laws of N.Y. 3272.
2. Driver Improvement Clinics. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 521 (McKinney Supp.
1974).
3. Driver Rehabilitation Program-Reports. N.Y. VEH. & Tam. LAW § 523 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
4. Administrative Appeals. N.Y. VEH. & TRA. LAW § 260 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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having thereafter been requested to submit to such chemical
test, refuses to submit to such chemical test, the test shall not
be given and a report of such refusal shall be forwarded by the
police officer under whose direction the test was requested to the
commissioner within seventy-two hours and the commissioner
shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any non-resident
operating privilege; provided, however, the commissioner shall
grant such person an opportunity to be heard, unless such opportunity is waived by such person, and provided further, however, that evidence of such refusal to submit to such chemical
test shall be admissible in any trial, proceeding or hearing based
upon a violation of the provisions of this section or the provisions
of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this chapter but only
upon a showing that the person was given sufficient warning, in
clear and unequivocal language, of the effect of such refusal and
that the person persisted in his refusal. [effective September 1,
1974].
In its current form, the implied consent law, section 1194,
bears scant resemblance to its procedurally barren predecessor,
section 71-a. 0 8 Neither arrest, nor warning of the consequences of
refusal, nor provision for an opportunity to be heard characterized the original statute. By the time of the recodification in 1959,
the arrest and hearing requirements had been incorporated."'
The added proviso that the defendant be given a "clear and unequivocal" warning echoes the mandate of the Mirandadecision."'
The development of the implied consent section, in particular,
reflects the course of decisional law, both on the federal and state
levels, amplifying and refining due process in the administration
of criminal justice.
V.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS-CASE LAW

In the mid-1960's, the United States Supreme Court announced landmark decisions elaborating the right of due process,
the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.
These affected both state criminal prosecutions and administrative proceedings. Other decisions of the New York courts focused
upon specific problems of proof, definitions of "refusal" under the
implied consent law and a miscellany of problems raised in DWI
litigation. To the extent that it is possible, the decisions in recent
208. Ch. 854, § 1, [1953] Laws of N.Y. 1876. See text accompanying note 40 supra,
209. Ch. 775, § 1194, [1959] Laws of N.Y. 2008-09. See note 106 supra.
210. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
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cases are organized in the following discussion to reflect categories of major issues.
The Right to Counsel and the PrivilegeAgainst
Self-Incrimination
In Miranda v. Arizona,2 1 the Supreme Court crystallized the
procedural safeguards necessary to protect the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when an individual is deprived of his freedom and subjected to custodial interrogation.2 12
The Court held as an "absolute prerequisite to interrogation"
that the individual must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him,
and that he has "the right to consult with a lawyer and to have
the lawyer with him during interrogation ....
"' To these three
basic rights of persons accused or suspected of crime, the Court
added a fourth: if the person in custody cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning.214
The Court observed that "compelling pressures" sensed by
a person in custody undermine "the will to resist" and remain
silent.2 1 5 He must be apprised of his rights in "clear and
unequivocal terms ' 21 6 so that he can avail himself of the opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination. The
fifth amendment privilege is not confined to criminal court proceedings but reaches any custodial questioning by a law enforcement officer where the person invoking the privilege believes
21 7
there may be criminal consequences.
But what was the nature or form of self-incrimination which
Miranda shielded? The general determination "we deal with the
2 ' was more
admissibility of statements""
explicitly developed in
1
2
Schmerber v. California. 1 Schmerber was arrested at a hospital
while under treatment for injuries resulting from an automobile
accident. A blood sample was withdrawn despite the fact that, on
211. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
212. For incorporation of the fifth amendment
fourteenth amendment, see Mallory v. Hogan, 378
213. 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
214. Id. at 479. The defendant may waive these
ily, knowingly and intelligently." Id. at 444.
215. Id. at 448-54, 467.
216. Id. at 467-68. This language is reflected
(McKinney Supp. 1974).
217. Id. at 461.
218. Id. at 439.
219. 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).

privilege within the protections of the
U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
rights if the waiver is made "voluntar-

in N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(4)
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advice of his counsel, he refused consent to a blood test. Results
of this chemical analysis revealed intoxication and were admitted
as evidence at the trial. Schmerber contended that he was denied
due process,22 deprived of the privilege against self-incrimination
and of his sixth amendment right to counsel,2 ' and subjected to
unreasonable search and seizure.2 1 The Court directed its attention to the privilege against self-incrimination.
Commencing with the principle that the fourteenth amendment rendered the fifth amendment privilege applicable to the
states, the Court held that an accused is protected "only from
being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in
question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends." 2 3
While the privilege reaches communications of the accused, it
does not extend to fingerprinting, photographing, writing or
22
speaking for identificationY.
Compelling the accused to serve as
the source of "real or physical evidence" is not a violation of the
privilege. 225 The majority appeared less than surefooted in the
distinction it drew between communicative evidence and physical evidence, but the decision clearly established that taking a
blood sample in an appropriate manner by a competent person
over the objection of a DWI suspect did not violate the constitutional protection against self-incrimination.
The Right to Counsel: New York Decisions
Recognition of the right to counsel in the pre- and postMiranda periods can be illustrated by four cases which reached
220. Id. at 759. The Court rejected the due process argument on the strength of
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).

221. The Court determined that Schmerber was not entitled to assert the sixth
amendment privilege. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766 (1966). He did have the
assistance of counsel.
222. In Schmerber, the police officer made an arrest without a warrant, based on his
observations that the defendant was intoxicated. Should the arresting officer have procured a search warrant before directing a blood test? "Search warrants are ordinarily
required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required
where intrusions into the human body are concerned." Id. at 760. However, the court
indulged what might have been the reasonable belief of the officer that delay might
destroy the evidence and concluded that obtaining a blood sample to establish the alcohol
content was "an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest." Id. at 761.
223. Id. It was conceded that compulsion was present when the police officer directed
the physician to withdraw blood over Schmerber's objection. Id. at 761.
224. Id. at 763-64.
225. Id. at 764.
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583

the New York Court of Appeals. In 1962, the court upheld revocation of a driver's license for his conditional refusal to take a blood
test, notwithstanding the denial of his request to consult an attorney. 21 Following his arrest for DWI, the driver asked permission
to telephone his lawyer before deciding whether or not to submit
to a chemical test. Permission was denied. He refused to be tested
and his license was revoked for that reason. However, the driver
was acquitted of the criminal charge of driving while intoxicated.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the defendant was acquitted he could claim no injury from the criminal action. The
right to counsel was confined to criminal prosecutions. 2 7 Revocation of license by the Commissioner was a civil proceeding.
On a different set of facts, the Court of Appeals again upheld
a license revocation where the arrested driver was refused access
to his attorney. In Story v. Hults, 22 the police arrested a driver
operating his car with a fiat tire and a steaming radiator. Charged
with driving while intoxicated, the driver refused four requests to
take a breath analysis test. Police advised him of his right to
counsel. The driver's attorney arrived just before the expiration
of the two hour period within which the breath test must be
administered. He was not permitted to see his client. The petitioner eventually pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. In an
article 78 proceeding, the Appellate Division, Second Department, confirmed the license revocation.22 9 The Court of Appeals
unanimously affirmed, unconvinced by petitioner's argument
that the Commissioner's act violated due process guarantees of
the federal and state constitutions.2 30
But in a 1968 decision, People v. Gursey,2' the Court of Appeals agreed that a defendant's conviction of DWI had to be
reversed. The defendant initially objected to taking a chemical
226. Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 59, 181 N.E.2d 427, 428, 226 N.Y.S.2d 40304 (1962), reversing 14 App. Div.2d 503, 218 N.Y.S.2d 132 (4th Dep't 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 912 (1962). The appellate division had held that due process required that
petitioner be given the opportunity to consult counsel since he was under arrest on a
criminal charge and since such consultation would not have occasioned unreasonable
delay. See also People v. Noble, 9 N.Y.2d 571, 574-75, 175 N.E.2d 451-52, 216 N.Y.S.2d
79, 81 (1961).
227. Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 62, 181 N.E.2d 427, 429-30, 226 N.Y.S.2d
403, 406 (1962).
228. 19 N.Y.2d 936, 228 N.E.2d 398, 281 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1967) (mem.).
229. Story v. Hults, 27 App. Div.2d 745, 277 N.Y.S.2d 391 (2d Dep't 1967).
230. Story v. Hults, 19 N.Y.2d 936, 937, 228 N.E.2d 398, 399, 281 N.Y.S.2d 342, 343
(1967).
231. 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968).
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test. While being questioned at the station house, the defendant
requested permission to call his attorney before taking the test.
The request was denied. The court observed that his privilege to
be advised by his attorney concerning the options available to
him under section 1194 was violated.23 The court distinguished
Story v. Hults on the grounds that Story involved a civil proceeding and that Story's attorney arrived too late. While upholding
the defendant's right to counsel in a criminal proceeding, Judge
Breitel cautioned:23 "If the lawyer is not physically present and
cannot be reached promptly by telephone or otherwise, the defendant may be required to elect between taking the test and submitting to revocation of the license, without the aid of counsel."
In 1971, the Court of Appeals examined the applicability of
both Schmerber 4 and Miranda to a DWI prosecution. People v.
Craft2 31 involved an intoxicated driver who collided with a utility
pole in Binghamton. After being placed under arrest, he consented to a blood test which showed that he was intoxicated. He
received no Miranda warnings. The driver was convicted in the
City Court of Binghamton for violating section 1192(2).
On appeal, the defendant argued that failure to give Miranda
warnings violated his right to counsel. Had an attorney advised
him against a blood test, he would not have consented and the
state would not have obtained the incriminating results. Chief
2 3
Judge Fuld, drawing upon the decision in Gilbert v. California, 1
found that the absence of defendant's lawyer at the time a blood
sample was withdrawn did not threaten his right to a fair trial.
Further, since Schmerber held "that one accused of drunk driving
may not prevent the State from conducting a blood test. . . there
is neither need nor reason for the presence of counsel. 2 371 The
232. Id. at 228, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419. See also, Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 486 (1963); People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 424, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443,
288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 467-68 (1968); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 153, 193 N.E.2d 628,
630, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (1963).
233. 22 N.Y.2d 224, 229, 239 N.E.2d 351, 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (1968). See also
Brady v. Tofany, App. Div.2d 987, 320 N.Y.S.2d 880 (3d Dep't 1971); Leopold v. Tofany,
68 Misc.2d 3, 325 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 38 App. Div.2d 550, 327
N.Y.S.2d 999 (2d Dep't 1971).
234. For discussion of the Schmerber issue, see text accompanying notes 219-25
supra.
235. 28 N.Y.2d 274, 270 N.E.2d 297, 321 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1971). The accident and arrest
occurred in May, 1966, one month before the U.S. Supreme Court handed down, the
Miranda and Schmerber opinions.
236. 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967).
237. People v. Craft, 28 N.Y.2d 274, 278, 270 N.E.2d 297, 299-300, 321 N.Y.S.2d 566,
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court distinguished Craft from Gursey on the grounds that
Gursey had expressly requested assistance of counsel and been
denied. 5
In summary, the New York Court of Appeals has ruled that
a defendant charged with driving while intoxicated need not be
given Miranda warnings as a condition precedent to a blood test,
that he has no right to the presence of counsel at the administration of such test, but that if he expressly requests counsel, he
must be given the opportunity to consult an attorney if such
consultation can be reasonably accomplished within the time
limit imposed by statute for the test.
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Since the Court of Appeals' decision in Craft, it is clear that
New York bars assertion of the privilege against incrimination
where a blood alcohol test is concerned. A suspected driver can
be made the source of real or physical evidence by a sample of
his blood, or as is now the more common practice, his breath,
without violating the protection against compelled testimonial
communications. The issue which has not been settled by the
Court of Appeals is the availability of the privilege to preclude
admissibility of results of performance tests conducted by the
police when the suspected driver is brought to the precinct station
following his apprehension on the road.
Two Nassau County District Court cases have reached divergent results. The practice of the Nassau County Police Department is to interrogate the suspect by posing inquiries set forth on
a form questionnaire.2 39 These questions probe the driver's activities before he was apprehended, intake of alcohol, medications
and food, and physical illnesses and disabilities. In addition to
responding to the questionnaire, the suspect is requested to perform coordination tests: walk a straight line, touch finger to nose,
pick up coins, etc. Are the responses to the questions and the
coordination tests admissible without prior Mirandawarnings? In
569 (1971), citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
238. People v. Craft, 28 N.Y.2d 274, 279, 270 N.E.2d 297, 300, 321 N.Y.S.2d 566, 570
(1971).
In an earlier case, People v. Sweeney, 55 Misc.2d 793, 286 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Dist. Ct.
Suffolk County 1968), the judge granted defendant's motion to suppress the results of a
breathalyzer test. The police claimed Miranda warnings were given to the driver. His
request to telephone an attorney before taking a test was denied. The court held that
defendant's sixth amendment rights were violated.
239. Nassau County Police Dep't Form No. 38.
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People v. McLaren,240 the court suppressed the results of both as
communications bearing directly on the suspect's guilt or innocence. But in People v. Suchocki, 4 ' another court admitted results of the coordination tests as evidence not of a communicative
or testimonial nature but analogous to the blood sample proof
exempted by Schmerber from the privilege against selfincrimination.242 Notwithstanding that Suchocki equated coordination tests with the handwriting and voice samples that were
excluded from the privilege against self-incrimination in Gilbert
v. California.43 It is submitted that the former are indeed communications of physiologic response which may be inculpatory.244
The apprehended driver should be given Miranda warnings before responding to the questionnaire and performing the coordination tests. If warnings are required and a defendant is not
apprised of his rights before the oral and physical responses are
elicited, the results of the tests might still be used to impeach the
credibility of the defendant should he take the stand.
A collateral issue involving the privilege against selfincrimination has been raised where the prosecution elicited testimony from an accused driver that he had refused to submit to
a blood alcohol content test. In People v. Paddock,45 the Court
of Appeals rested on a prior determination 4 forbidding comment
upon failure to submit to a chemical test. However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Jasen called attention to the Schmerber conclusion that no constitutional privilege prevented a state from
compelling a driver suspected of intoxication to submit to a blood
247
test:
Consequently ....

it necessarily follows that there can be no

constitutional prohibitions to prevent comment upon the accused's failure to take the test.
240. 55 Misc.2d 676, 285 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1967).

241. 57 Misc.2d 26, 291 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
242. Id. at 28, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
243. 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
244. For a discussion of testimonial and nontestimonial inculpatory communications,
see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
245. 29 N.Y.2d 504, 272 N.E.2d 486, 323 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1971). For a reassertion of this
position, declaring ch. 35, L. 1973 unconstitutional, see note 249 infra.
246. People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362 (3d Dep't 1955), afl'd,
1 N.Y.2d 664, 133 N.E.2d 516, 150 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1956).
247. People v. Paddock, 29 N.Y.2d 504, 505-06, 272 N.E.2d 486-87, 323 N.Y.S.2d 977
(Jasen, J., concurring).
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. . . Since the statute itself equates a refusal with guilt (by
revoking the driver's license) and expresses a strong policy to
protect the public from the threat of drunken driving, there
appears to be no compelling reason to forbid comment on a
person's refusal to take a blood test.

Although case law had firmly established the inadmissibility
of proof that a driver declined to submit to a chemical test, the
legislature nevertheless enacted an amendment of section 1194
specifically to permit evidence of refusal in judicial and administrative proceedings. 248 This amendment has been declared unconstitutional, a violation of defendants' fifth amendment rights, in
249
a recent decision of the Supreme Court, Bronx County.
Admissibility of Blood Tests
In several recent cases, the admissibility of a blood test has
again been raised by defendants on the grounds that the test was
not preceded by an arrest or that the sample was not withdrawn
within two hours of arrest in accordance with the requirements
of section 1194.

While the result of a blood test not conforming to section
1194 could not be utilized to convict a driver under section
1192(2) (prohibiting operation of vehicle by a person with a .10
BAC), it could be introduced into evidence if accompanied by
expert testimony in a prosecution under section 1192(3) (driving
while intoxicated) .25 If observational testimony convinces the
jury of a defendant's intoxication, he can be found guilty of the
crime without the admission of the blood test results.25 Where the
248. N.Y. VEH. & TRu. LAw § 1194(2)(McKinney Supp. 1974), amending ch. 445, §
1, [1971] Laws of N.Y. 1310, to read:
[E]vidence of such refusal to submit to such chemical test shall be admissible
in any trial, proceeding or hearing based upon a violation of the provisions of
this section or the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this chapter but only upon a showing that the person was given sufficient-warning, in
clear and unequivocal language, of the effect of such refusal and that the person
persisted in his refusal.
249. People v. Rodriguez, 173 N.Y.L.J. 40, February 28, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
250. See People v. Blowers, 79 Misc.2d 462, 360 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Rensselaer County Ct.
1974). See also People v. Wenceslao, 69 Misc.2d 160, 329 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Crim. Ct. Kings
County 1972) (conviction under section 1192(3)).
251. See People v. Bump, 68 Misc.2d 533, 327 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Broome County Ct. 1971).
In People v. Flynn, 73 Misc.2d 178,340 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Seneca County Ct. 1973), defendant
was charged with manslaughter. No arrest was made at the time he consented to a blood
test. The result revealed a .23 BAC. Defendant had not received Miranda warnings. The
court held that the blood test result could be admitted into evidence before a grand jury.
Since defendant had consented, there was no need for an arrest. In David v. Granger, 35
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defendant refused a blood test and then contended that proof of
his impairment was deficient because based on circumstantial
evidence, the court held that no particular test (of BAC) is required and that intoxication may be proved by opinion
evidence.5

2

A novel issue surfaced in Cook v. Town of Nassau, 23 a negligence action,-in which the courts below barred admission of evidence of the alcohol content of a blood sample of Cook, the deceased operator of a motorcycle. The administratrix of Cook alleged negligence on the part of the town in the maintenance of a
bridge abutment. The coroner had performed an autopsy including an alcohol analysis, pursuant to section 674(3)(b) of the
County Law. 2 4 Prior to the enactment of this section in 1971,

results of alcohol tests included in an autopsy report were admissible. The Court of Appeals in Cook held that the clear mandate
of the statute now forbids the use of such blood test results in a
negligence action. The conclusion was not reached without difficulty since section 677(3)(b) of the same statute provides that
autopsy records can be made available to the representative,
spouse or next of kin of the deceased "or to any person who is or
may be affected in a civil or criminal action by the contents of
the record of any investigation. . .

."

The majority found the

specific prollibition of section 674(3)(b) controlling.2 5 Admission
of the alcohol analysis might have aided the town in its defense
since it could not produce evidence of decedent's intoxication
from witnesses.
App. Div.2d 636, 312 N.Y.S.2d 963 (3d Dep't 1970), a civil suit, a blood test not administered in conformity with section 1194, however, was not admissible into evidence in a civil

suit.
252. People v. Herzog, 75 Misc.2d 631, 348 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1973) (wherein the court found defendant guilty of DWAI (section 1192(1)).
253. 33 N.Y.2d 7, 300 N.E.2d 706, 347 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1973).
254. N.Y. CouNTY LAW § 674(3)(b) (McKinney 1972).

The coroner or coroner and coroner's physician, or the medical examiner,
also shall make or cause to be made, quantitative tests for alcohol on the body
of every operator of a motor vehicle or a pedestrian eighteen years of age or older
who was involved in and died as a result of a motor vehicle accident; provided,
however, such tests shall not be made pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph if such coroner, coroner's physician or medical examiner has actual knowledge that the decedent is of a religious faith which is opposed to such test on
religious or moral grounds. Such results shall be used only for the purpose of
compiling statistical data and shall not be admitted into evidence or otherwise
disclosed in any legal action or other proceeding.
255. Cook v. Town of Nassau, 33 N.Y.2d 7, 10, 300 N.E.2d 706, 708, 347 N.Y.S.2d
165, 167, (1973).
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In People v. Porter,26 the Appellate Division, Third Department examined a battery of objections raised by the defendant
as to the admissibility of blood test results, including the issue
of whether the business records of a deceased chemist could be
introduced to establish the defendant's BAC level. The court held
that the testimony of the chemist's co-employee laid the proper
foundation to qualify the records as a business entry exception to
the hearsay rule. 6 1Failureof Proof
Where the facts revealed that the suspected driver admitted
to having a few drinks but had been taking medication and his
impairment could have been caused either by the use of prescribed drugs or a combination of the drugs and the results of the
accident, the people failed to prove defendant guilty of DWAI.27
Convictions have been reversed where there was a sharp issue of
fact and the prosecution failed to call as a witness an officer
present at the scene 2171- and where the prosecutor failed to give
defendant notice of intention to introduce at trial an inculpatory
admission and also interjected improper remarks in his
summation .2.2
A driver charged with violating section 1192 (2) (driving with
.10 BAC) was convicted on the lesser offense of impairment (section 1192(1)).21 Although the information alleged that defendant
had a BAC of .22 at the time of the occurrence, no evidence of
any chemical test was introduced at the trial. The court found
defendant guilty of DWAI on the basis of observational testimony
2 59
of the police.
256. 46 App. Div.2d 307, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1974).
256.1 Id. at 311, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
257. People v. Van Tuyl, 79 Misc.2d 262, 359 N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Term, 9th & 10th

Jud. Dists. 1974). Expert testimony was introduced to the effect that the two drinks
defendant admitted imbibing would not cause intoxication but that the medication could
cause disorientation. Defendant's testimony that his physician failed to warn him of the
effect of the medication was uncontroverted.

257.1 People v. Gainey, 172 N.Y.L.J. 59, Sept. 23, 1974, at 20 Col. 2 (App. Term).
257.2 People v. Duran, 172 N.Y.L.J. 74, Oct. 15, 1974, at 2, col. 4 (App. Term).
258. People v. Kaeppel, 74 Misc.2d 220, 342 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County
1973).
259. Id. at 221, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 884. The defendant and a friend stopped at a restaurant after first visiting a bar. A disturbance ensued and the police arrived. The defendant
contended that a police officer directed him to drive away from the restaurant and that
he then was stopped by police within 100-150 feet of the restaurant. The defendant raised
the affirmative defense of entrapment. The court rejected this argument as the factual
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Proof of Operationof a Motor Vehicle
Recent cases have not disclosed unusual problems in proving
that the DWI suspect was operating a motor vehicle."' Operation
has been inferred where the defendant was asleep in the driver's
" ' and has been established
seat with the motor running26
as a fact
where the suspect made a voluntary statement to a stranger that
he was the only one involved in an accident when his car veered
into a snowbank. 2 2 Proof was insufficient, however, when an in-

toxicated passenger unintentionally depressed the accelerator." 3
In another case, the driver was found at a bar more than two
hours after a property damage accident involving only his vehicle
had been reported to police; the court found that the arresting
officer acted upon "pure speculation" rather than reasonable
grounds to believe that the defendant was intoxicated at the time
26 4
he drove the vehicle.

As a whole, the New York courts have adhered to a generally
accepted interpretation of what constitutes operation of a motor
vehicle and to traditional standards of direct and circumstantial
proof of such operation.6 5
Judicial Notice of the Reliability of the Breathalyzer
In the infancy of the use of blood alcohol analysis to establish
the DWI offense, it was necessary to transport the suspected
driver to a hospital or summon a physician in the middle of the
night to withdraw a sample of blood. While this may still be the
practice in sparsely -populated country hollows, the clearly preferred procedure is to employ breath analysis tests administered
by trained members of police departments. The Harger Drunkometer, one of the oldest breath-testing instruments, was employed in New York in the 1950's.26 The Breathalyzer, in use by
situation was determined not to be within the definition of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05
(McKinney 1971). Id. at 222, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
260. For more complete treatment of this topic, see discussion at notes 129-33 supra
and accompanying text.
261. People v. Marriott, 37 App. Div.2d 868, 325 N.Y.S.2d 177 (3d Dep't 1971).
262. People v. Ridley, 65 Misc.2d 547, 318 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Tompkins County Ct. 1971).
263. People v. Marzulli, 76 Misc.2d 971, 351 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Appellate Term, 2d &
11th Jud. Dists. 1973).
264. Boyle v. Tofany, 44 App. Div.2d 342, 344, 355 N.Y.S.2d 208, 210 (3d Dep't 1974).
265. See generally R. ERwIN, DEFENSE

OF DRUNK

DRVsNo CASES § 1.01 (3d ed. 1971).

266. See People v. Donaldson, 5 Misc.2d 699, 152 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Monroe County Ct.
1956).
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the mid-1950's has apparently become the instrument of choice.
It approximates the alcohol content of blood by passage of a
measured volume of alveolar air through potassium dichromate
in sulphuric acid, permitting oxidization to occur, and measuring
the resulting color change of the reagent with an integral photoelectric filter photometer. 217 Members of police departments
undergo a period of specific training to qualify as technicians
administering the breathalyzer test.
The end result of the breath analysis procedure is a BAC
reading-the fraction of one percent by weight of alcohol in the
blood of the subject. But introduction at trial of a defendant's
BAC level was far from a short-cut to conviction. In addition to
establishing the qualifications of the person administering the
test and the exact ritual he followed in preparing and operating
the machine, the prosecution was required to lay an elaborate
foundation for the reliability and accuracy of the instrument itself.2 61 These details consumed hours of trial time.
An end to the laborious repetition of expert testimony to lay
the foundation for admitting BAC readings in evidence was her265
alded in 1970 by Judge Donovan's opinion in People v. Morris,
in which he analogized the recognized accuracy of the Breathalyzer to the radar speedometer. 20 A year later, the Fourth Department of the Appellate Division after a detailed examination of the
scientific principles on which the instrument is based concluded
in People v. Donaldson that, "the time has come when we may
recognize the general reliability of the Breathalyzer as a device
for measuring the concentration of alcohol in the blood, and that
it is not necessary to require expert testimony as to the nature,
function or scientific principles underlying it ....,,21 While the
Donaldson decision takes judicial notice of the Breathalyzer's
reliability, it does not relieve the prosecution of proving that a
qualified person administered the test, properly prepared the instrument for use and that the chemicals employed were of the
267. See ERWIN, supra note 265, at §§ 22.01 to 22.02.
268. See id. at §§ 22.04-24.04 (examples of actual cross examinations). See also
People v. Seger, 63 Misc.2d 921, 314 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Amherst Town Ct. 1970).
269. 63 Misc. 2d 124, 311 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1970).
270. Id. at 127, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 56. See also People v. Dusing, 5 N.Y.2d 126, 155
N.E.2d 393, 181 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1959); People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 170
N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958).
271. People v. Donaldson, 36 App. Div.2d 37, 40, 319 N.Y.S.2d 172, 176 (4th Dep't
1971).
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2
right kind and proportion. 21
In summary, recent cases have not raised unusual problems
pertaining to the admissibility of proof. With respect to two matters, however, the courts will not follow the precedent of earlier
decisions. The first change permits admissibility of Breathalyzer
test results without expert testimony to establish the reliability
of the instrument. The second modification is of legislative creation: the amendment in 1973 of section 1194(2) which makes
admissible in any trial, proceeding or hearing, evidence that the
defendant refused to submit to a chemical test. 3 This new statutory provision has been declared unconstitutional by one trial
court, and undoubtedly the issue will reach the Court of Appeals.274

Miscellaneous Issues in DWI Prosecutions: Sufficiency of
Information or Indictment: Sentencing
Before proceeding to consider the particular questions raised
in article 78 litigations in which the defendant challenges the
revocation of his operator's license, some residual problems recurring in recent DWI prosecutions ought to be examined.
Motions to dismiss informations or indictments may be
made on various grounds specified in the Criminal Procedure
Law. 27 5 For purposes of this study, only challenges to the sufficiency or accuracy of the accusatory instrument or supporting
deposition will be considered.26
A simplified traffic information 271 has been dismissed where
the defendant requested but was not supplied with a sufficient
supporting deposition to show that there was reasonable cause to
believe defendant had committed every element of the offense
272. See Roy v. Reid, 38 App. Div.2d 717, 329 N.Y.S.2d 417 (2d Dep't 1972); People
v. Meikrantz, 77 Misc.2d 892, 351 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Broome County Ct. 1974); People v.
Tyree, 75 Misc.2d 912, 349 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Mt. Vernon City Ct. 1973).
273. See note 248 supra and accompanying text.
274. See note 249 supra. For discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination, see
notes 241-49 supra and accompanying text.
275. N.Y. Cram. PRO. LAw §§ 170.30, 170.35, 210.20, 210.35 (McKinney 1971).
276. It should be noted, however, that in several recent cases, defendant has moved

to dismiss on the ground that he has been denied a speedy trial as required by N.Y. CrM.
PRO. LAW §§ 30.20, 30.30(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974). The motion was not successful
in the following cases: De Vito v. Aylward, 77 Misc.2d 524, 354 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sup. Ct.
Jefferson County 1974); People v. Butor, 75 Misc.2d 558, 348 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Dutchess
County Ct. 1973); People v. Zagorsky, 73 Misc.2d 420, 341 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Broome County
Ct. 1973); People v. Fox, 170 N.Y.L.J. 119, Dec. 21, 1973, at 17, col. 6 (Suffolk County
Ct.).
277. N.Y. CaM. PRo. LAW § 100.10(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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charged.278 Since the simplified traffic information is a bare state-

ment of the offense charged, the supporting deposition is essential
to enable the defendant to prepare his defense.
5 the deposition stated that defendant
In People v. Hust,11
swerved, struck a parked car and the police officer "felt" defendant was intoxicated; the court held it did not supply a factual
basis for reasonable cause to believe defendant was driving while
intoxicated.28 Similarly where defendant was charged with DWI
and the information stated merely that he was driving in an "erratic manner," the court agreed that defendant was entitled to a
bill of particulars. 21 If an indictment was pending he could dis-

cover those portions of the Alcohol Influence Report containing
his responses to the officer's questions and the record of Tests for
Impairment of Ability (coordination tests) ;282 the latter was a
report "concerning physical or mental examinations or scientific
tests . . .made in connection with the case. .

."

However,

discovery did not extend to "Visual Examinations," i.e., statements based on the police officer's observations. The court classified recorded observations as exempt work product.214
The appellate term has reversed a district court dismissal of
an information charging defendant with driving while in an intoxicated condition (section 1192(3)) where the prosecution did in
fact prove a violation of section 1192 (2) by evidence of breathalyzer test results showing a .24 BAC. 25 The Appellate Division,
Third Department has held that the two offenses, section 1192 (2)
and (3) are joinable in an indictment. 288 They are separate charges
278. People v. Hust, 74 Misc.2d 887, 346 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Broome County Ct. 1973);
The statutory basis is N.Y. CRMI. PRO. LAW §§ 100.25(2), 100.40(2), 170.35(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
279. 74 Misc.2d 887, 346 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Broome County Ct. 1973).
280. Id. at 890, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 307. See also People v. Brick, 32 Misc.2d 73, 222
N.Y.S.2d 388 (Long Beach City Ct. 1962).
281. People v. Lawrence, 74 Misc.2d 1019, 346 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Suffolk County Dist.
Ct. 1973).
282. N.Y. CRMI.PRo. LAw § 240.20(1)(b) (McKinney 1971).
283. Id. § 240.20(2). Had defendant submitted to a chemical test, he would have been
entitled to discover a report of the results. Id.
284. Id. §§ 240.10(3), 240.20(3).
285. People v. Fielder, 78 Misc.2d 7, 358 N.Y.S.2d 263 (App. Term 2d Dist. 1974),
reversing 73 Misc.2d 446, 348 N.Y.S.2d 72 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1973). In another
case, People v. Meikrantz, 77 Misc.2d 892, 351 N.Y.S.2d 549, (Broome County Ct. 1974),
court held that defendant could not properly be convicted of section 1192 (2) and (3) where
only one uniform traffic ticket was served and one simplified information filed.
286. People v. McDonough, 39 App. Div.2d 188, 333 N.Y.S.2d 128 (3d Dep't 1972).
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based on the same act.2"' A lower court dismissed the first count
of an indictment which alleged merely that defendant operated
a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition"' but upheld a
second count (which did not specify the statutory provision defendant allegedly violated) because it included language referring
to a breath test. 289 The court assumed that the district attorney
meant to allude to section 1192(2). Perhaps the court should not
be so indulgent with careless pleading in the light of the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Law.29
An ancillary issue in prosecutions coupling charges under
section 1192 (2) and (3) is whether conviction of both offenses
constitutes double jeopardy. In People v. Rudd 211 the Appellate
Division, Third Department adhered to its opinion in People v.
McDonough292 that driving with a statutorily prohibited BAC
level (subdivision 2) and driving while in an intoxicated condition
(subdivision 3) defined separate and distinct crimes. While a defendant may be convicted of both, he cannot be imprisoned for
one offense and fined for the other since both offenses were committed by a single act or omission.293
A question of singular importance has arisen when a defendant is charged with DWI after a prior conviction for the same
crime. Section 1192(5) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides
that a person violating subdivisions (2) or (3) after having been
convicted of one of these offenses within the preceding ten years,
has committed a felony for which the punishment is a maximum
of two years imprisonment or a fine of $2000 or both. The Penal
Law provides that it shall govern "the classification and designation of every offense, whether defined within or outside of this
chapter.

' 29 4

The felony described in sectionl192(5) being one

without specification is deemed, under the Penal Law, to be a
sentence of imClass E felony, 29 5 which carries an indeterminate
28
years.
four
of
maximum
a
with
prisonment
287. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 200.20(2)(a) (McKinney 1971). See People v. Rudd, 41
App. Div.2d 875, 343 N.Y.S.2d 17 (3d Dep't 1973); People v. Evans, 75 Misc.2d 726, 348
N.Y.S.2d 826 (Spring Valley J. Ct. 1973).
288. People v. Richlin, 74 Misc.2d 906, 346 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Schyler County Ct. 1973).
289. Id. at 908, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
290. N.Y. CraM. PRO. LAW § 200.50 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
291. 41 App. Div.2d 875, 343 N.Y.S.2d 17 (3d Dep't 1973).
292. 39 App. Div.2d 188, 333 N.Y.S.2d 128 (3d Dep't 1972).
293. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.15 (McKinney 1967).
294. Id. § 55.00.
295. Id. § 55.10.
296. Id. § 70.00(2)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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2 defendant was convicted of DWI as a
In People v. Bouton,57
felony and given an indeterminate sentence with a maximum of
four years. He contended that his sentence could not exceed the
two year maximum specified in the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The
Appellate Division, Fourth Department agreed with the lower
court in rejecting the defendant's challenge to the sentence imposed upon him and held that the Penal Law controlled. The
Third Department's Appellate Division has ruled to the same
effect."'
By way of a human interest addendum to the problems of
sentencing DWI offenders, one might note the Second Depart-

ment, Appellate Division's decision in People v. McCann.291 The

appellate division affirmed convictions of the defendant for driving while intoxicated and while ability was impaired by drugs.
But as a matter of discretion and in the interest of justice, it
directed that the three months penitentiary sentence be served on
weekends. The defendant was a college student not previously
"involved with the law."
Issues in Article 78 Proceedings:Arrest, Warning, Refusal
The issues dominating article 78 proceedings in which the
petitioner seeks annulment of his license revocation can be expressed in three basic questions. Was there a valid arrest? Was
defendant properly informed of the consequences of refusing a
chemical test? Did defendant, in fact, refuse the request to submit to a test?
Attacks upon the lawfulness of an arrest have focused on
such matters as who may make an arrest,"0 where,30 ' and under
what circumstances the arrest may be made. Only the last of
these recurs with sufficient frequency to elevate it to an issue of
297. 71 Misc.2d 1095, 338 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Ontario County Ct. 1972), aff'd, 40 App.
Div.2d 383, 341 N.Y.S.2d 561 (4th Dep't 1973).
298. See People v. Messinger, 43 App. Div.2d 15, 349 N.Y.S.2d 834 (3d Dep't 1973).
See also People v. Dailey, 45 App. Div.2d 910, 358 N.Y.S.2d 232 (3d Dep't 1974) which

raised a question of whether a maximum sentence of four years should be imposed on a
defendant who alleged he was induced to plead guilty by the court's statement that DWI
as a felony carried a maximum sentence of two years.
299. 43 App. Div.2d 744, 350 N.Y.S.2d 720 (2d Dep't 1973).

300. See Murray v. Tofany, 33 App. Div.2d 1080, 307 N.Y.S.2d 776 (3d Dep't 1970)
(special policemen of a village have power to make DWI arrest).

301. See Manley v. Tofany, 70 Misc.2d 910, 335 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. Chenango
County 1972) (section 1192 simply proscribes drunk driving and does not specify where
such conduct is prohibited. In this case, the operator was arrested for DWI on the driveway

of the state police barracks).
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importance in DWI case law. Prior to September 1, 1969, the
effective date of section 1193-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law," 2
the validity of an arrest without a warrant depended upon compliance either with section 177 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure"3 or section 1193 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The
former required that the offense be committed in the officer's
presence; the latter permitted an arrest for a violation of section
1192, though not committed in the officer's presence, if such violation was coupled with an accident or collision. Section 1193-a
by implication permitted an arrest where a preliminary field
30 4
breath test indicated that the driver had consumed alcohol.
Where there has been property damage to vehicles and admissions by petitioners or observations by the police of intoxication, courts have had no difficulty in upholding arrests under
section 1193. 311 But a car parked along the side of the road with a
person asleep on the front seat does not make out an offense
committed in the presence of an officer or a violation of section
1192 coupled with an accident.3 6 Essentially, determining the
validity of an arrest is not a matter of overwhelming difficulty.
Courts will inquire into the position of the vehicle or vehicles,
statements of the drivers, police officers' observations of such
things as staggering, slurred speech, and the physical appearance
of the operator and will draw a common sense conclusion as to
whether or not the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe that the petitioner was operating a vehicle in an intoxicated
condition. If the conclusion is affirmative and the operator has
refused a chemical test after a proper warning, the license revocation by the Commissioner will be upheld.
The second significant question in article 78 challenges to
license revocation focuses on the sufficiency of the warning given
to the arrested driver. Was he notified of the consequences of
302. Ch. 1027, § 1, [1969] Laws of N.Y. 2563 (codified at N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1193(a) (McKinney 1970)).
303. Ch. 442 [1881] Laws of N.Y. 601, as amended, N.Y. CaM. Pno. LAW § 140.10
(McKinney 1971).
304. This section was amended effective September 1, 1971 to eliminate the time
period requirement that the breath test indicate consumption of alcohol within three
hours of the test. N.Y. Vrso. & TR". LAw § 1193(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974), amending
ch. 200, § 1, [1971] Laws of N.Y. 795.
305. See Van Tassell v. New York State Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 46 App. Div.2d
984, 362 N.Y.S.2d 281 (3d Dep't 1974); Williams v. Tofany, 46 App. Div.2d 708, 360
N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dep't 1974); Van Wormer v. Tofany, 28 App. Div.2d 941, 281 N.Y.S.2d
491 (3d Dep't 1967); Brown v. Hults, 24 App. Div. 2d 1058, 265 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d Dep't
1965).
306. See June v. Tofany, 34 App. Div.2d 732, 311 N.Y.S.2d 782 (4th Dep't 1970).
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refusing a BAC test, that is, that his license would be revoked
whether or not he was found guilty of violating section 1192?07 At
the outset, it should be noted that the warning requirement was
first included in the implied consent statute (section 1194) in 1968
and became effective on October 1 of that year." 8 Recent cases
can be summarized along the lines of a few simple conclusions.
A warning to the defendant that if he refuses a BAC test his
license will be suspended is defective.30° Revocation is the penalty
for refusal and a revoked license, unlike one that is suspended, is
not returned within a fixed period but requires approval by the
Commissioner before a new license may be issued. The warning
must be given before a defendant refuses a chemical test."' The
fact that a defendant has availed himself of the opportunity to
consult with his attorney does not eliminate the necessity of a
warning. 31' The warning must notify the arrested driver that his
license will be revoked for refusal to submit to a test, regardless
of the outcome of the DWI prosecution. 2 Thus, recent decisional
law justifies the conclusion that courts will strictly construe the
requirements of section 1194 and insist upon a clear, timely and
comprehensive warning by the enforcement officer. A defective
warning voids the refusal.
The third, common issue in article 78 proceedings centers on
a defendant's contention that he did not decline to submit to a
chemical test. Several variations on the theme of whether or not
a defendant actually refused emerge from the cases.
One fact pattern is characterized by a defendant's claim that
he was willing to undertake a test if administered by a physician
307. N.Y. VEH. & TRF. LAW § 1194(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
308. Ch. 85, § 1, [1968] Laws of N.Y. 672. See Kramer v. Tofany, 35 App. Div.2d
237, 315 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1970).
309. See Pucino v. Tofany, 60 Misc.2d 778, 304 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess
County 1969).
310. See Ferreri v. Tofany, 60 Misc.2d 534, 303 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1969). But should defendant refuse the first request to take a test after a proper warning
the warning need not be repeated if the request is repeated. Zambroski v. Tofany, 40 App.
Div.2d 885, 337 N.Y.S.2d 2 (3d Dep't 1972), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 968, 293 N.E.2d 257, 341
N.Y.S.2d 111 (1973).
311. See Maines v. Tofany, 61 Misc.2d 546, 293 N.E.2d 257, 306 N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup.
Ct. Broome County 1969).
312. See Connors v. Tofany, 37 App. Div.2d 402, 326 N.Y.S.2d 365 (3d Dep't 1971);
Maxfield v. Tofany, 34 App. Div.2d 869, 310 N.Y.S.2d 783 (3d Dep't 1970), aff'g 60
Misc.2d 916, 304 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1969) (The court viewed
with skepticism the later sworn report of the police officer containing the formal language
of the required warning, after his testimony had revealed an incomplete warning.); cf.
Mistler v. Tofany, 39 App. Div.2d 710, 331 N.Y.S.2d 960 (2d Dep't 1972).
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of his choice. The courts have uniformly held that a defendant
cannot condition consent upon administration of the test by his
own physician, 3 ' or upon the opportunity to consult counsel before undergoing a test,"4 or by dictating how or under what circumstances he should be tested."' At the same time, however,
one court has held that, where a defendant who was taken to a
hospital for a blood test refused to sign a hospital form which
might have been a release from liability for negligence, the issue
of consent could not be determined absent evidence as to the
31 6
content of the form.

In another category of cases, the Appellate Divisions of the
Third and Fourth Departments have affirmed the revocation of
a defendant's license on the ground that they believed the police
officer's testimony concerning actual refusal rather than the defendant's contention that, sometime short of the two-hour-fromarrest time limitation, he signified acquiescence.3 17 In some instances, a defendant may refuse, then consent and subsequently
repeat his refusal, possibly followed by another consent. The
31
court has regarded this as a refusal.

1

The issues of actual refusal and the sufficiency of a warning
exposing the consequences of refusal are obviously interrelated.
To what extent, nonetheless, are the court's efforts to find an
"understanding refusal" 319 realistic? The underlying question in
313. See Cushman v. Tofany, 36 App. Div.2d 1000, 321 N.Y.S.2d 831 (3d Dep't 1971);
Shields v. Hults, 26 App. Div.2d 971, 274 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dep't 1966); Sowa v. Hults,
22 App. Div.2d 730, 253 N.Y.S.2d 294 (3d Dep't 1964).
314. See Brady v. Tofany, 36 App. Div.2d 987, 320 N.Y.S.2d 880 (3d Dep't 1971),
aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 680, 274 N.E.2d 748, 325 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1971). But see Leopold v. Tofany,
68 Misc.2d 3, 325 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), afl'd, 38 App. Div.2d 550,
327 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1st Dep't 1971).
315. See Blattner v. Tofany, 34 App. Div.2d 1066, 312 N.Y.S.2d 173 (3d Dep't 1970);
cf. Doubbins v. Tofany, 39 App. Div.2d 870, 328 N.Y.S. 2d 1004 (3d Dep't 1972); Beck v.
Tofany, 70 Misc.2d 273, 332 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1972).
316. Robbins v. Tofany, 32 App. Div.2d 988, 301 N.Y.S.2d 726 (3d Dep't 1969). The
court rejected the police officer's "incompetent statement" that he explained to the driver
"that it's just routine that he's not signing away any of his rights. . . ." Id. at 988, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 727. Cf. Cappallo v. Tofany, 35 App. Div.2d 898, 315 N.Y.S.2d 785 (3d Dep't
1970), (where the court found the release issue to be a recent fabrication of defendant and
upheld the revocation of his license).
317. See Bonnell v. Tofany, 43 App. Div.2d 773, 350 N.Y.S.2d 413 (3d Dep't 1973);
Spears v. Tofany, 43 App. Div.2d 583, 340 N.Y.S.2d 413 (4th Dep't 1973).
318. See O'Dea v. Tofany, 41 App. Div.2d 888, 342 N.Y.S.2d 679 (4th Dep't 1973).
But cf. Jentzen v. Tofany, 33 App. Div.2d 532, 314 N.Y.S.2d 297 (4th Dep't 1969), motion
for leave to appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 513, motion for stay denied, 33 N.Y.2d 644 (1973).
319. Jentzen v. Tofany, 33 App. Div.2d 532, 314 N.Y.S.2d 297 (4th Dep't 1969),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 513, motion for stay denied, 33 N.Y.2d 644
(1973).
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cases involving warning and refusal issues is whether an intoxicated driver can, in fact, understand the implications of his decision; the "understanding refusal" which is legally sufficient may
be far short of actual comprehension.

VI. A BACKWARD AND A FORWARD GLANCE
To summarize the intricacies of the massive case law which
has developed over more than six decades of the offense of driving
while intoxicated would be futile. Attempts have been made,
particularly in Part V of this study, to mark the issues and the
areas where the law has come to rest, thus permitting some conclusions as to how courts will continue to decide certain questions
of proof. One reason for the complexity of the offense is that it
must be dealt with on two planes: the criminal and the administrative. It requires double vision, in a sense, to perceive all the
consequences of driving while intoxicated simultaneously from
two perspectives. Courts have solved discrete evidentiary issues
by traditional principles common to criminal prosecutions. Successive legislatures have enacted, amended, recodified, repealed
and patched the law to such an extent that one senses a basic
indecision, an ambivalence and a despair. Can this type of conduct, potentially so destructive to the individual offender and
innocent victims be brought within the control of legislatures and
courts?
In an overview of the statutory development, one can discern
both a tough line approach and a contradictory stagnancy in
adhering to a .15 presumptive BAC when many other states had
adopted a .10 standard. 32 As early as 1929, the legislature decided that one of the penalties for conviction of DWI should be
mandatory revocation of an operator's license. This is still the
law. But it was not until 1971, that the legislature adopted a more
restrictive approach in lowering the BAC level for the per se misdemeanor from .15 to .12, and in 1972, to .10. In the interim, the
legislature created the DWAI traffic infraction and the drug impairment misdemeanor, still retained, but also established and
later discarded special standards for drivers under twenty-one
years of age. The implied consent law of 1953 was so deficient in
due process safeguards that it required substantial amendments
to qualify it on constitutional grounds.
320. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227a (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:
4-50.1 (Supp. 1973).
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The evolution of the implied consent law illustrates more
clearly than any other aspect of the DWI offense the interfacing
of the work of the courts and the efforts of the legislature. By
stages, section 1194 has been refined; the request to submit to a
chemical test must be preceded by a valid arrest and a clear and
unequivocal warning of the consequences of refusal. The operator
whose license is subject to revocation must be granted an opportunity for a hearing. But it should be observed that the statute
still retains the questionable provision vesting authority in the
Commissioner to suspend a license temporarily without notice,
based upon a verified report of a police officer that he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person violated any subdivision of section 1192.321
While in 1962, the Court of Appeals held that an arrested
motorist's specific request to consult with his attorney could be
denied without infringing on the right to counsel,32 1 in 1968, that
same court reversed a conviction involving similar circumstances.3 An intervening factor was the Supreme Court's decision in
Miranda, which was also reflected in the 1968 amendment of the
implied consent law to require a clear warning of the consequences of refusing to submit to a chemical test for BAC. 34 At one
other point, a juncture of the legislative and judicial processes is
evident. In 1970, a statutory amendment recognized the necessity
25
of plea bargaining.
It is safe to conclude that neither the courts nor the legislature are satisfied that the law has effectively dealt with the problem of the intoxicated driver. Can it be overcome by public education and costly, institutionalized programs of rehabilitation?
There is evidence, at least for one county of the state, Nassau, that an integrated program of countermeasures to reduce the
incidence of alcohol related traffic injuries and fatalities proved
unsuccessful. From January, 1971 to June, 1973, a demonstration
program-the Alcohol Safety Action Project-was sponsored in
Nassau County by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.32 6 The particular countermeasures employed were a spe321. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974).

322. Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962).
For discussion, see notes 228-29 supra and accompanying text.
323. People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968). For
discussion, see notes 233-35 supra and accompanying text.
324. See discussion at notes 171-72 supra and accompanying text.
325. See discussion at note 193 supra and accompanying text.
326. D. PREUSSER & R. PALMER, THE NAssAu CouNTY ALCOHOL SAFETY ACTION PROJECT:
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cial police enforcement team, a rehabilitation program and a
public education effort. Comparing the operational years of the
project with a baseline period of 1968-70, analysts of the total
program concluded that the project failed to produce the desired
results. Over all, there was no decline in alcohol related fatalities
and injuries; BAC's for fatally injured drivers continued at almost
the same level; in both periods, data revealed that approximately
50 percent of tested drivers had been drinking prior to their fatal
crash.32
One effect of the recent national policy to channel resources
into highway safety programs and encourage local safety campaigns3 is the increase in arrests for drunk driving. Estimates for
New York State point to a substantial upswing in arrests made
by police agencies of the state.32 9 Allocating large sums of money
to DWI enforcement can be expected to yield more arrests and
more prosecutions instituted. The DWI offense, however, is but
one of many criminal offenses which must compete for available
funds allocated to police agencies and the courts.
More efficient enforcement has the result of increasing the
number of cases to a level which the criminal courts, as now
constituted, cannot realistically try, with or without a jury. The
impasse is "resolved" by plea bargaining; the driver charged with
intoxication pleads guilty to driving while impaired, speeding or
reckless driving. While the pressure of the criminal caseload necessitates such a resolution, it also avoids confronting head-on a
dissatisfaction with the substantive criminal law as it now stands.
Plea bargaining may be a response solely to the administrative
difficulties encountered by courts in processing the large volume
of DWI charges. It may also reflect reservations on the part of
legislators, judges and the public (represented by jurors) that
drunk driving, at least where fatalities or serious personal injuries
are not involved, should not be dealt with so severely as the
present statute requires."
(1974) (Report prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Transportation).
327. Id., Foreward & p.11.
328. See Highway Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 731 (codified in scattered sections of
23 U.S.C.).
329. Testimony of Julian D. Rivo, Director of Research and Program Development
for the N.Y. State Traffic Safety Council, Before N. YS. Select Legislative Comm. on
Transportation,197th N.Y. Leg. (1974). Police agencies in N.Y. made 20,028 drunk driving arrests in 1970 and 38,512 in 1973, a 92 percent increase in a three year period.
330. This may be an expression of social attitudes which underlie the "process of
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If this supposition is tenable, then perhaps a statutory approach which scales the offense based on the consequences, rather
than solely on the conduct, is feasible. Driving while intoxicated
or driving with a BAC of .10 or more could be denominated a
traffic infraction where no personal injury and no, or only slight,
property damage results. A vehicle operator who weaves down the
road and is stopped by police for this erratic driving, and whose
intoxicated condition is established by sufficient evidence, might
be charged with a traffic infraction. It should be noted that this
operator has not collided with any person or object. But his conduct in operating a vehicle in an intoxicated condition is proscribed by law.
Charges of this kind could, with appropriate legislation, be
channeled to an administrative adjudication process. At present
moving traffic violations in cities with a population of 275,000 or
more may be determined by hearing officers appointed by the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. 3 ' The hearing officer may impose the penalties provided by the Vehicle and Traffic Law for
conviction of a violation with the exception of a sentence of imprisonment. Thus DWI cases involving an arrest for the conduct
itself where no injurious consequences have resulted could be
removed from the courts. It is suggested, however, that at least a
60 day suspension of the operator's license should be one of the
penalties of conviction. No plea bargaining could take place. The
hearing officer would be required to make a determination on the
offense charged and no other.33
divestment" as Nicholas N. Kittrie describes it, a process whereby the criminal law has
relinquished "its jurisdiction over many of its traditional subjects and areas." N. KITrnu,
THE RIGHT TO BE DFEu ENT 4 (1971).
331. N.Y. VE. & TaR". LAW §§ 225-227 (McKinney Supp. 1974). The system of
administrative adjudication of moving violations is currently in effect in New York City,
Buffalo and Rochester. The constitutionality of the system, challenged on equal protection
N.Y.S.2d
App. Div.2d -,
grounds, was upheld in Johnston v. Jenczka (4th Dep't 1974).
332. While the hearing officer has no authority to accept a plea to a reduced charge,
the charged offense need be established by "clear and convincing evidence" rather than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in Rosenthal v. Hartnett, 71 Misc.2d 264, 335
N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972), the court held N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 227
(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974), which provides that traffic infractions may be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, unconstitutional on due process grounds. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals, held, Article 2-A and specifically section 227(i) is constitutional; petitioner's
right to due process is not denied by the requirement that traffic infractions may be found
by "clear and convincing evidence" rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt." 173
N.Y.L.J. 58, March 26, 1975, at 9, col. 1.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss3/1

62

King and Tipperman: The Offense of Driving while Intoxicated: The Development of Stat

Driving While Intoxicated

Where, by contrast, the conduct of driving while intoxicated
causes death or injury to others or property, it ought to constitute
a misdemeanor, whether in the form now incorporated in section
1192 or as the crime of reckless endangerment, or criminally negligent homicide. The latter suggestions are based on the belief
that persons who are intoxicated have a realization of this fact
and know, or should know, that driving is clearly contrary to the
safety of others and themselves. In operating a motor vehicle
under such circumstances, they are at least negligent and quite
possibly reckless. It should be noted that in defining "recklessly,"
the New York Penal Law states, "[a] person who creates such a
[substantial and unjustifiable] risk but is unaware thereof solely
by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with re' Obviously such charges must be heard by the
spect thereto."333
courts. A mandatory revocation of the operator's license to drive
is a penalty which should be retained in these cases.
Suspension or revocation of an operator's license creates a
substantial problem for one whose livelihood is dependent upon
use of a car to travel to and from work. One suggestion is that an
"occupational license" be issued permitting driving only for the
purposes of commuting between the residence and place of employment. This restriction is difficult to enforce and would require police manpower for surveillance. It is not a facile remedy
to implement. Perhaps some agency working with the courts
should assist in solving the problem of transporation for the motorist whose license has been revoked. Whether or not this is
possible, or possible in all cases, should not, however, result in the
elimination of the revocation penalty.
At the same time, the responsibility of the community does
not terminate with punishment of the DWI offender. While various rehabilitation programs have been tried and found wanting,
efforts must continue to devise a medical-psychologicalsociological identification and treatment program not only after
the individual has caused death or injury but before such serious
consequences occur. Thus far the law has not provided, and perhaps it cannot provide a solution. The supportive services of the
333. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3) (McKinney 1967). See also, id. §§ 15.05(4), 120.20,
125.10. One problem which arises in classifying serious injury DWI cases as reckless or
criminally negligent conduct is jury reaction. If sympathetic jurors hesitate to convict
under the present DWI statute, they may be markedly more reluctant to find a defendant
guilty of a crime which bears a label and connotations of a type of conduct far more
socially reprehensible than driving while intoxicated.
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courts, trained professionals in the medical and social sciences,
engineering technologists, and at the base a concerned community-all of these may be the composite of resources required
to confront the problem of the intoxicated driver.
In his jurisprudential analysis of the efficacy of law, Professor
34
Harry Jones commented:
Statutes and case-law principles do not operate in social settings
over which lawmakers have total mastery. In a sense, lawmakers
propose, but society disposes. . ..
Until society is disposed to treat driving while intoxicated as a
serious, multi-dimensional problem which has not responded to
traditional criminal sanctions, the law continued in its present
form and direction cannot achieve efficacy.
334. H. JONES, THE EFFICACY

OF LAw

40 (1969).
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